B.J.Pol.S. 47, 165–185 Copyright © Cambridge University Press, 2015 doi:10.1017/S0007123415000174 First published online 1 September 2015 Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World’s States, 1975–2010 KAARE W. STRØM, SCOTT GATES, BENJAMIN A.T. GRAHAM AND HÅVARD STRAND* Arrangements for sharing political power serve three purposes: to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the policy process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority. A new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975–2010, is introduced here, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining. Existing literature associates power sharing with democracy and civil conflict resolution. Unlike the existing literature, this dataset shows inclusive institu- tions are common in post-conflict states, though least strongly associated with electoral democracy. Conversely, constraining institutions, though comparatively rare in states with current or recent civil conflicts, are highly correlated with electoral democracy. A widespread belief has emerged, supported by a range of empirical studies, that political power sharing institutions have many virtues and benefits. Broadly speaking, power sharing arrangements limit the ability of stronger groups to use the power of the state for their own factional purposes. They appear to promote political equality in societies characterized by deep and enduring divisions. They lower the stakes of political contestation and thus arguably promote kinder and gentler policies. 1 And they promise to minimize the risk of civil conflict. 2 Yet, the properties of power sharing are not yet well understood. Nearly fifty years of scholarship have produced a rich literature but not yet a parsimonious and broadly accepted definition of political power sharing. This is at least in part because the relevant scholarship has evolved in two contexts and within two rather distinct scholarly communities. Existing scholarship thus typically analyzes power sharing practices in relation to one of two phenomena of broad political import: democracy and civil conflict. Arend Lijphart’s analysis of consociational democracy was thus originally informed by the experience of the Netherlands and other smaller European democracies, whose histories have been largely peaceful in spite of sometimes profound social divisions, but which are first and foremost democratic. 3 Steiner, and more recently Norris, accepted Lijphart’s conception of power sharing as a distinctive institutionalization of democracy. 4 In contrast, a large part of recent research has examined political power sharing in more precarious circumstances, often in efforts to end civil war or insurgency or as a remedy for societies threatened by such conflict. 5 The demands on power sharing institutions under these * UC San Diego and University of Oslo (email: kstrom@ucsd.edu); Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and University of Oslo (email: scott@prio.no); University of Southern California (email: benjamin.a.graham@usc.edu); PRIO and University of Oslo (email: hs@prio.no). The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SES-081950766b; PI: Strøm) and the Norwegian Research Council (196850/F10; PI: Gates). Data replication sets are available at http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS. 1 Lijphart 2012; Norris 2008. 2 Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Sisk 1996. 3 Lijphart 1968; Lijphart 1977. 4 Norris 2008; Steiner 1974. 5 Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Sisk 1996. https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000174 Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.191.125.211, on 16 Jan 2017 at 02:15:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at