Are Psychological “Ethics Codes” Morally Oblique? Thomas Teo York University The question is raised whether the American and Canadian codes of ethics for psychologists (codes) are able to address some of the most important moral issues that have plagued the discipline of psychology in recent history. Applying Habermas’s distinction between pragmatic, ethical, and moral reasoning, the codes are challenged on moral grounds and calls for reflexivity are articulated. Using examples from academia and psychological practice, lacunae of the codes are disclosed. First it is argued that the ethics codes are not equipped to deal with epistemological violence that is expressed in some research articles. Second it is suggested that the codes, despite their apparently clear articulation, are not immune to ideological changes that have been observed on the background of the “War on Terror.” Finally, it is argued that the codes ignore and provide no ethical guidelines when dealing with work that is based on financial conflicts of interest that afflict recent versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). Reflections on the possibility for postconventional codes are included. Keywords: conflict of interest, critical psychology, epistemological violence, interrogation, postconventional morality “What ought I to do?” is not a question of theoretical but practical reason. In the philo- sophical tradition, particularly the Kantian one, theoretical reason pertains to problems of the truth of propositions, whereas practical reason refers to pragmatic, ethical, and moral decisions (Habermas, 1991, 1993). Thus, the question “what should I do as a psychologist?” can be answered pragmatically, ethically, or morally, whereby these three domains demand different types of justifications, arguments, and dis- courses, according to Habermas (1993). He as- sociates pragmatic arguments with the utilitar- ian tradition in philosophy, ethical deliberations with the Aristotelian framework, and moral judgments with Kantian theory. For Habermas pragmatic discourses follow a rationality of purposes that focuses on develop- ing techniques, strategies, and programs to solve a problem. Pragmatic debates have an affinity to empirical discourses because knowl- edge is related to preferences and ends, and consequences of decisions are assessed. Prag- matic discourses refer to conceivable applica- tions but there is no intrinsic relationship be- tween reason and will. Applied to the Ethics Codes 1 (American Psychological Association, 2010; Canadian Psychological Association, 2000) one could ask: “How do I make sure that I comply with a Code?” “What ought I to do in order that my research proposal follows a Code and is accepted by an ethics board?” “How do I formulate an informed consent declaration that follows a Code?” “How do I deal with personal conflict of interest situations?” But as Habermas points out not all questions of “what I should I do?” can be answered in the realm of pragmatics. As soon as values them- selves become problematic one needs to go beyond pragmatic rationality. Ethical questions since Aristotle concern the meaning of a good life (see also Fowers, 2012). Ethics is not about addressing particular purposes; rather, it is about asking questions about the value of the “good.” In ethical discourses the rational ques- tion of “what should I do?” is intrinsically con- 1 In this paper, the terms Codes or Ethics Codes refer to the American Ethical Principles of Psychologists (American Code, APA Code) or the Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists (Canadian Code, CPA Code). This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- dressed to Thomas Teo, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. E-mail: tteo@yorku.ca This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology © 2015 American Psychological Association 2015, Vol. 35, No. 2, 78 – 89 1068-8471/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038944 78