Studia Gilsoniana 5:2 (April–June 2016): 365–390 | ISSN 2300–0066 Fr. Tomasz Duma John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin Poland PERSONALISM IN THE LUBLIN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY (CARD. KAROL WOJTYàA, FR. MIECZYSàAW A. KRĄPIEC) As we know, the problem of person has a very long history in the philosophical tradition. We also know that, in the beginning, this was a question of Divine Persons—the concept of person which, on the basis of Greek terminology (hyposthasis, prosopon), was formulated in con- nection with this question, and made it possible to explain the crucial truths of Christianity: namely, the One God in Three Persons and the ontic unity of Jesus Christ. The Fathers of the Church (e.g., St. Augustine) had already been aware that the notion of person is the most suitable for expressing the specific and special character of the human being. The awareness of this became even sharper in the modern times when the problem of human being started to be undertaken outside a theological context. But the anthropological turning point came only in the twentieth century, which was connected, firstly, with the rise of philosophical anthropology as a separate branch of philosophy, and secondly, with a philosophical trend called “personalism.” This trend was neither uniform nor clearly defined. Some viewed it as a kind of protest against an incredible contempt for the human person which was so pervasive in twentieth century totalitarianisms. Some treated person- alism as an intellectual and cultural movement which, analogically to