1 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET CONCENTRATION OF INTERMEDIARIES ON THE PRICE-MAKING IN THE TWO- SIDED MARKET OF TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENT Marina Balandina 1 Graduate School of Economics and Management, The Ural Federal University after the first President of Russia B.N.Yeltsin, Russia, Yekaterinburg ABSTRACT In many two-sided markets, platforms use intermediary agents to reach consumers at one side of the market, but in the most recent models of two-sided markets the intermediaries are ignored. The purpose of this paper is to discuss that existence of intermediaries between platform and end-users in two-sided market is one of the factors that influences on the market concentration and price-level. This paper derives suggestions for econometric modeling of demand in a TV-advertising market as a two-sided market with the presence of media sales houses (intermediaries who sell advertising slots of a particular channels). We use panel data on fifteen TV channels in Russia(Yekaterinburg) that spans the period January 2011–October 2016 and present our econometric analysis. The data is particularly interesting as we observe a period of January 2015-March 2015, when the Federal Law of Advertisement has been changed dramatically and market structure changed (for three months the market of TV advertisement was monopolized - one monopoly sales house sold out the advertisement on all TV channels, and after that in April 2015 this market has become an oligopoly market again). We estimate the demand equation of advertisers. The obtained estimates show that the cost per advertisement minute is higher for channels, which do not contract out their ad sales. And the prices in concentrated market (monopoly) are found to be approximately 7% lower compared to oligopoly market. Keywords: two-sided markets, TV advertisement, competition policy, concentration, intermediaries.