A Modified Pseudo-Voter Identity (PVID) Scheme for e-Voting Preparation Stage Nidal F. Shilbayeh Faculty of computers and Information Technology University of Tabuk Tabuk, Saudi Arabia n_shilbayeh@yahoo.com Musbah M. Aqel Faculty of information Technology AlZarqa University Amman, Jordan Aqelm06@yahoo.com Reem Ali Al-Saidi Faculty of Information Technology Middle East University Amman – Jordan Abstract— In this paper, a modified PVID has been proposed and analyzed. The modified PVID scheme includes some improvements in the used PVID Scheme. In the proposed scheme, the PVID authority issues a voter certificate obtained only once for each eligible voter. This certificate will increase the security in any e-voting scheme that uses the PVID scheme. In addition to that, this certificate only issued once and verified by responder (an additional entity has been added to the PVID) in an attempt to prevent double voting. The issued voter certificate will be multi-encrypted with voter public key (e v ) and PVID authority private key (PR PVID-Authority ). A Password Generator (PG) has been added for the voter to generate a unique password for each eligible voter, instead of using the traditional voter password, as an attacker may keep track of the voters' password and compromise it. Security requirement analysis has been given Keywords-component; e-voting, PVID, Pseudo Voter Identity, Blind Signature, e-voting Scheme I. INTRODUCTION In the recent two decades E-voting became a hot research topic in advanced cryptography, posing several new challenges to fulfill voting general requirements. The challenge arises primarily from the needs to convince the voters that security and democracy requirements such as privacy, accuracy, receipt-freeness and verifiability were achieved and thus reduced their fear towards using E voting by providing them with a trusted E voting that they can rely on. Many scientists and researchers [1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11]; explored in E voting cryptographic field in order to overcome the security issues in the election process. Each made his/her own contribution towards a trusted E voting but all agree about the major schemes that can be classified into three main categories: A blind signature scheme, the homomorphic encryption scheme and the mixing net scheme. Each of the above mentioned schemes underlies many protocols, these protocols try to achieve some general security requirements (e.g. by using a blind signature, the voter privacy will be guaranteed). Also, a combination between these schemes is possible depending on the requirements. The protocols under blind signature scheme are considered as the most commonly implemented due to their practicality and applicability, at which the voter first obtains a token, which has been blindly signed by the administrator and which is only known to the voter her/himself. Later, the voter sends her vote anonymously, with this token as proof of eligibility to the auditing for counting. While, in the homomorphic scheme the voter cooperates with the administrator in order to construct an encryption of his/her vote. Then, the administrator exploits homomorphic prosperities of encryption algorithm to compute the encrypted tally directly from the encrypted votes. For the mixing net scheme is the most common approach to achieving anonymity. The general concept of mix nets is based on permuting and shuffling the messages in order to hide the relation between the message and its sender. However, the details, as to the implementation of mixing protocols, change depending on configurations and arrangements of mix-nets. In the existing voting protocols [1, 5, 6, 8, 12], voter generally uses his/her real identity while communicating with the authorities. While, in PVID scheme introduces by [3], voter uses pseudo identities, which have no relation with the voter's real identity and are unlinkable to it. In PVID scheme, voter prepares a list of blinded identities and then he/she obtains blind signature for each of them separately by interacting with the approval authority in one session. Later, voter extracts anonymous pseudo identities (PVIDs) which are unlinkable to voter registration identity. Each of PVID is selected by the voter and blindly signed by the approval authority after verifying voter eligibility. These list of blindly signed pseudo identities is only known by the voter and uses them throughout the entire communication while interacting with the authorities. Some modification had been applied to the used PVID scheme. PVID authority issues a voter certificate obtained only