Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait inferences ☆ Frank Van Overwalle a, ⁎, Marijke Van Duynslaeger a , Daphné Coomans a , Bert Timmermans b a Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium b Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital of Cologne, Germany abstract article info Article history: Received 7 February 2011 Revised 17 June 2011 Available online 6 July 2011 Keywords: Spontaneous inferences Multiple Inferences Goals Traits We present four experiments in which participants were exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and goals. Results from a false recognition task with varying response deadlines revealed heightened activation of goal inferences already within a 350 ms response deadline. In contrast, trait inferences were made only when there was no response deadline, and when the behavior also implied a goal. These results indicate that spontaneous inferences on goals are often encoded more strongly in memory and are reactivated much more quickly in comparison with spontaneous trait inferences. Moreover, spontaneous trait inferences are often facilitated when an inference is first made on the goal of the behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent developmental and neuroscientific evidence on social inferences, and current theories on impression formation. © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. When you see two runners sprinting towards the finish line, what thoughts spring to your mind immediately? That each of them wants to win (i.e., their goals), or that they are very athletic (i.e., their traits)? Behavioral research has established that observers often make inferences when observing others' actions spontaneously, that is, without explicit intention to do so and unaware of making the inference itself (Uleman, 1999). Spontaneous inferences are made about a variety of social targets, such as an actor's traits or dispositions (for an overview, see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996), an actor's goals (Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005; Van Duynslaeger et al., submitted for publication), situational circumstances (e.g. Duff & Newman, 1997; Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson, 1990), and external causes of events (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002). More importantly, it has been documented that social inferences about an actor's stable traits and transitory situations can be activated spontaneously at the same time, and co-occur together (Ham & Vonk, 2003; Todd, Molden, Ham, & Vonk, 2011). That behaviors spontaneously activate multiple co-occurring inferences is consistent with a young history of theorizing and research on person impression (Idson & Mischel, 2001; Read, Jones, & Miller, 1990; Reeder, 2009; Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004; Trzebinski, McGlynn, Gray, & Tubbs, 1985) and research on text comprehension (e.g., Graesser, Lang, & Roberts, 1991; Kintsch, 1988). However, social research has rarely explored whether different types of spontaneous inferences are inferred equally easily and spontaneously. That is, even if trait and goal inferences are activated concurrently, one of them could overshadow the other, or made with more ease and speed than the other, which might reflect the dependency of one inference on the other. Reconsider the example above. When you see two athletes approaching the finish, what inference comes to mind most quickly? We propose that “wants to win” comes to mind foremost, and only later on we wonder who the best athlete is. That is, quite often, goals are primary and traits are secondary. In the social literature on impression formation, there is considerable work on goals as the basis of many trait inferences. In one of the most recent accounts, Reeder (2009, p. 1) argued that “perceivers draw a sharp distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior. Intentional behavior is explained primarily in terms of the actor's aims and motives. In turn, perceivers use their inferences about motive to fashion trait judgments about the actor.” Reeder illustrates this process with the following example. If during a sports contest one player makes an aggressive move toward an adversary, the inferences depend on the player's motive. If the player had been insulted by the adversary, the inference centers on the motive for revenge. Conversely, if the adversary had been performing extremely well and was about to win, the inference centers on the goal of personal gain (“wanting to win”). Although revenge is not an admirable motive, it is more socially accepted than personal gain, so that the player will be seen as less morally corrupt when the aggressive move was motived by revenge rather than personal gain. As this example shows, it are not so much the situational circumstances that shape the trait inference, but rather the inferred Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 13–18 ☆ We express our gratitude to three anonymous reviewers who provided numerous helpful suggestions for improving an earlier version of this manuscript. ⁎ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel, Belgium. E-mail address: Frank.VanOverwalle@vub.ac.be (F. Van Overwalle). 0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.06.016 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Experimental Social Psychology journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp