The risks of the (overly?) broad-based approach in Dutch counter-terrorism policy Bob de Graaff The difficulties of counter-terrorism in the narrower sense There is of course every reason to prevent the establishment of terrorist organisations, given the suffering and social disruption they can cause. 1 A second reason for prevention is that terrorist groups are difficult to eliminate. Even relatively small and hierarchically-organised groups like the IRA and ETA succeeded in maintaining their existence for decades, despite numerous arrests. This is all the more the case for such organisations as al-Qa’ida, who adopt the form of a so-called scale-free network, in other words a relatively informal social network with a limited hierarchy and a high degree of decentralisation. The members of any such network know a limited number of other members, but can reach every other member via just a small number of intermediaries. In certain cases, specifically to ensure the continued existence of the organisation, double relationships are established. In addition, the members improvise their activities and take on changing responsibilities and tasks. On the one hand, therefore, the interconnectivity in such a network is high, whilst on the other hand knowledge about the network as such is very limited, amongst the members. This makes such groups very difficult to combat. Computer simulations indicate that such networks will even survive removal of eighty percent of their members. 2 The regenerative capacity of al-Qa’ida and of groups affiliated to or inspired by that organisation has emerged as being considerable. It is therefore questionable whether in response to thousands of killed and arrested jihadists, their numbers are in fact increasing more rapidly on a worldwide basis, such that it is effectively a case of banging our heads against a brick wall. 3 In addition, it is difficult, in Western societies to observe and follow a group of more than several hundred terrorists who are able to attack at any moment, seven days a week, 24 hours a day. If this were the ambition, even a relatively small increase in the number of terrorists would rapidly lead to the establishment of a police or snoop state. The idea is therefore very attractive, rather than deploying several dozen people for each terrorist, to attempt to prevent the individual in question radicalising to the status of terrorist, through far less effort. 4 An additional advantage is that the background from which terrorists emerge is more accessible to data collection by the government 5 than are the terrorists themselves. These considerations lead to a twin-track policy: on the one hand, terrorists must be closely monitored and possibly eliminated; on the other hand, the radicalisation of others to the status 1 Cf. M. Jacobson, The West at War. U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts, Post-September 11, Washington DC 2006, 28. 2 A.-L. Barabasi, Linked. How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science and Everyday Life, Cambridge, MA, 2003, 113; Cf. A.-L. Barabasi, M. Newman & D. Watts, Structure and Dynamics of Networks, Princeton, NJ, 2006. 3 K. Cragin & S. Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror. Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA, 2005, iii en 67; B. Hoffman, Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?, Santa Monica, CA, 2005, 2; M. Ranstorp & G.P. Herd, ‘Approaches to countering terrorism and CIST’, in: A. Aldis & G.P. Herd (eds.), The ideological war on terror. Worldwide strategies for counter-terrorism, London/New York 2007, 3. 4 The term radicalisation here is used in the meaning of ‘a process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politico-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods’, Statement of Lidewijde Ongering before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 27 June 2007. 5 P. Waldmann, ‘Zur Erklärung und Prognose von terrorismus’, U.E. Kemmesies (ed.), Terrorismus und Extremismus – der Zukunft auf der Spur, Munich 2006, 260.