Citation: Mattice, Sarah. 2022.
Shinran as Global Philosopher.
Religions 13: 105. https://doi.org/
10.3390/rel13020105
Academic Editor: Jeffrey L. Richey
Received: 5 December 2021
Accepted: 14 January 2022
Published: 21 January 2022
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religions
Article
Shinran as Global Philosopher
Sarah Mattice
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 32224, USA;
s.mattice@unf.edu
Abstract: Gutoku Shinran 愚禿親鸞 (1173–1263) is one of Japan’s most creative and influential
thinkers. He is the (posthumous) founder of what ultimately became J ¯ odo Shinsh ¯ u, better known
today as Shin Buddhism, the most widely practiced form of Buddhism in Japan. Despite this, his
work has not received the global attention of other historical Japanese philosophical figures such
as K ¯ ukai 空海 (774–835) or D ¯ ogen 道元 (1200–1253). The relationships of influence between Shin
Buddhism in general—or Shinran’s work more specifically—and earlier Chinese sources, especially
non-Buddhist sources, are complex, rarely examined in much detail, and often buried under layers of
interpretive difficulties, made all the more challenging for contemporary Anglophone scholars by
the ways in which Shin Buddhism has been marginalized in much of the philosophical scholarship
on East Asian traditions. Exploring his work through a lens of connection to the broader Chinese
philosophical landscape reveals new insights, both for our understanding of Shinran’s philosophical
project, and for contemporary comparative engagement across East Asian traditions, helping to
resituate Shinran as a globally significant philosopher.
Keywords: Shinran; comparative philosophy; hermeneutic failure
1. A History of Hermeneutic Failures
Outside of Japan, Pure Land Buddhism in general, and Shin Buddhism in particular,
have not received a great deal of philosophical scholarly attention. Dennis Hirota argues
that there are two main reasons for this marginalization of Pure Land Buddhism. The
first is:
the lingering assumption, vigorously asserted in the nineteenth century by Chris-
tian missionaries in Japan, that Shin is not only geographically and temporally
removed from ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ Buddhism but removed fundamentally in
philosophical outlook and soteriology. (Hirota 2019, p. 415)
In other words, one reason for the scholarly marginalization of Shin Buddhism is that
it was not seen by early western scholars as “real” Buddhism. When we consider how
scholars in the nineteenth century were thinking about Buddhism, this begins to make
more sense. Buddhism was introduced to the West by scholars such as Charles Hardwick
(1821–1859), who had this to say about it:
What I intend by Buddhism is the system of metaphysical and social philosophy,
organized by Shakyamuni or Gautama Buddha. Neither am I speaking here of
Buddhism in its modern development, as modified by intermixtures either with
the popular forms of Brahmanism, or with the older superstitions of the countries
where it afterwards gained a footing: for that view of it will come more properly
before us, when we pass from Hindustan to China, and the other regions where
it still possesses a complete ascendancy. In different words, we shall be dealing
now with a philosophy rather than with a religion. (Hardwick 1882; Masuzawa
2005, p. 127)
A scholarly vision of Buddhism, imposed from this kind of starting point, would
certainly struggle with Pure Land traditions, which differ in many key respects from the
Religions 2022, 13, 105. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13020105 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions