Formal and Fundamental Ontology in Husserl and Heidegger John Rogove Archives Husserl de Paris 1. Some Voraussetzungen. One of the paradoxes of Heidegger-reception in the English-speaking world has been that, as Heidegger studies have come to be increasingly integrated into “mainstream” analytically- inspired currents of anglophone philosophy, his thought and problematics have had to be adapted to a conceptual framework whose origins are often to be found in metaphysical and methodological commitments that Heidegger rejected on a most fundamental level. However far so-called “analytic” philosophy may have moved from its origins in Logical Positivism (and how far indeed it has lost the identifying characteristics of a “school” or method with which it started can be seen in the increasing difficulty of identifying “analytic” philosophy as a unified movement or style at all), much of its underlying interrogative framework and many of its metaphysical presuppositions remain dialectically beholden to that initial moment’s commitments to things such as scientism, naturalism, nominalism or empiricism. As has been the case with other “Continental” thinkers, such as Hegel or Merleau-Ponty, the price of their admission was their integration into a reception-framework that attempted to digest them on the framework’s terms, rather than on their own. As Jean-Luc Marion once quipped, the Anglo- Americans “don’t study Heidegger, they use Heidegger”. His thought is one more tool in a kit made for tasks determined elsewhere and otherwise. The paradox in this situation can be most vividly illustrated by understanding that the philosophy in question, the one providing the conceptual reception-framework, might be taken to be directly or indirectly descended from Carnap, who in 1932 famously rejected Heidegger’s