1 Constructing Morality with Mengzi: Three Lessons on the Metaethics of Moral Progress Jing Hu and Seth Robertson (Forthcoming in Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality, ed. Colin Marshall. Routledge.) Introduction It is in some ways surprising to include the early Confucian philosopher Mengzi (Mencius) [372-289 BCE] in a volume devoted to neglected voices in metaethics, and in other ways, not surprising at all. It is surprising in that in contemporary east Asian cultures and philosophy, Mengzi is not neglected. He is one of the most prominent and influential philosophers in east Asia, and in terms of relative impact both on philosophical traditions and on public life, he has been one of the most influential philosophers in history. It is not surprising to include Mengzi in this volume, however, for at least two reasons. First, despite being one of the most influential philosophers in history, Mengzi is largely ignored in contemporary Anglo- American moral philosophy. Second, Mengzi himself seemed less interested in questions we might think of as metaethical and much more interested in theoretical questions at the intersection of moral psychology and normative ethics, as well as in practical and normative questions about moral development, virtue, political legitimacy, and good governance. But, despite his limited interest in metaethical issues, we will argue here that there are several valuable insights for contemporary metaethics that we can draw from Mengzi’s work – especially concerning moral change, discovery, and progress. 1 There seem to have been genuine 1 Mengzi represents what some would call the intuitionist wing of Confucianism and may be largely responsible for the impression that Confucianism and even the whole of Chinese philosophy relies heavily on intuitions. Even though Mengzi did not directly engage in what we would call metaethical inquiries, his normative and naturalistic