211 | POLIS n.º 4 (II série) Julho / Dezembro 2021 PARLAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ICELAND Parlamentary elections in Iceland (25th of September 2021) Ricardo Leite Pinto 1 DOI: https://doi.org/10.34628/kht1-mg53 1. Introduction A former territory of the Kingdom of Denmark which became an independent republic in 1944, 2 Iceland 3 is, on various levels, an in- teresting case-study regarding its recent political and electoral evo- lution, especially after the fnancial and economic crisis of 2008. In truth, it was this crisis’ sequels which were the catalysts of the attempted “popular” constitutional reform, which if successful would have allowed to substantially replace or review the 1944 Constitution and the reconfguration of the party system with the emergence of several new parties, the fusion of old political forces as well as the programmatic modifcation of some traditional par- ties. We shall take a lateral approach to some of these aspects, given that the essence of the present work is the holding of elections to the Icelandic Parliament (known in its original term as “Althingi”) which took place on the 25 th of September 2021. This was the 30 th electoral act to the legislative assembly since 1931 and the results were surprising to most observers. 2. The inconclusive Icelandic constitutional reform. Even if the (aborted) Icelandic constitutional reform did not have a direct infuence over the election results of the 25 th of September 2021, the fact is that the subject was discussed during the election campaign and all running parties took their stance on the mat- 1 Integrated Researcher at the Centre for Legal, Economic and Environmental Stu- dies (CEJEA). Head of the Research Group “Public Law and Political Theory”. The author would like to thank Professor Manuel Monteiro for the contribution given regarding the identifcation and interpretation of Iceland’s electoral system. 2 Although since 1918 the Act of Union between Denmark and Iceland did recognize the plain sovereignty and independence of Iceland under the form of a “personal union” (monarchic) with Denmark. 3 See the analysis of 1995 parliamentary elections in José Matos Correia, “Islândia: eleições legislativas de 8 de Abril de 1995”. POLIS, Ano I, no. 3 Abril-Junho 1995, pp. 185 ss. ter. Some historical references are justifed, as this was a never-be- fore-seen event on the world’s constitutional history, and at the time, it raised some attention of the world’s public opinion which had been following the matter, as well as, even if quite scarce, ac- ademic thought from the viewpoint of the Political Sciences and Constitutional Law. 4 In the context of the troublesome events which took place after the collapse of the Icelandic banking system (2008) an idea of a dem- ocratic and truly popular constitutional process which would give rise to a new Constitution replacing the one from 1944 or which would profoundly review it started to gain traction in the midst of activists and politicians (mostly between the left-wing political forces). 5 In the early hours of this process two popular national Assemblies were organized in 2009 and 2010, the frst with the par- ticipation of about 1500 citizens enrolled in the electoral lists, se- lected by lottery, in order to discuss the fundamental points of the new Constitution. With the formation of a left-wing government led by the Social Democratic Alliance after the 2009 elections, a new bill was passed aimed at framing the constitutional review pro- cedure by foreseeing the direct election of a Constitutional Assem- bly composed by 25 delegates tasked with drafting a Constitution which would encompass the contributions of the original popular assemblies and any suggestion made by citizens using universal free-to-use digital platforms on the internet and most social net- works. The election of the 25 delegates took place on the 27 th of November 2010 with a surprisingly low turnout (36%). However, 4 Regarding the unsuccessful constitutional reform, the most complete works pub- lished in English and reconstituting an historiographical approach to events by the hand of their direct participants, MPs, members of the Constitutional Council, ac- tivists, and academics involved in the process is Águst Pór Árnasson and Catherine Dupré, eds. Icelandic Constitucional Reform: People, Processes, Politics, Routledge, 2020. 5 The formal mandate which started the constitutional process wasn’t clear regarding its own goal: To review the 1944 constitution or to draft a new Constitution, to some authors that was one of the main causes of the constitutional process’ lack of success. See Jón Ólafsson, “The Constitucional Assembly, A study in failure” in Val- ur Ingimundarson, Philipe Urfalino e Irma Erlingsdóttir, eds. Iceland´s Financial Crisis, The Politics of Blame, Protest and Reconstruction, Routledge, 2016,pp. 253 e 264. Another relevant consequence of the Icelandic crisis was the judgement and conviction of former Prime-Minister Geir Haarde (2006-2009) by a Court (Court of Impeachment), based on negligence of ministerial duties (art. 14 of the Iceland’s Constitution). See Jón Ólafsson, “The case against leaders: A moral reading of Geir Haarde´s Conviction for Negligence of ministerial duties” Frontiers of Political Sci- ence, Vol. 3, May 2021 ( https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.619719).