Tony Yengeni’s Ritual Slaughter: Animal Anti-Cruelty vs. Culture 1 Kevin Behrens Department of Philosophy University of the Witwatersrand Private Bag 3 Wits 2050 South Africa Email: kevin@earthfriendly.co.za Abstract I address the question: ‘Are acts of the ritual slaughter of animals, of the kind recently engaged in by the Yengeni family, morally justifiable?’ Using the Yengeni incident as a springboard for my discussion, I focus on the moral question of the relative weight of two competing ethical claims. I weigh the claim that we have an obligation not to cause animals pain without good rea- son against the claim by cultures that traditional practices, such as the one under discussion, are morally justifiable on the basis of the moral goods ob- tained through cultural identification and participation. I attempt to show that claims justifying practices on the basis of culture are not strong enough to outweigh the prima facie wrong of causing non-human animals unnecessary pain. 1. Introduction The ritual slaughter of a bull as a traditional cleansing ceremony for the family of Tony Yengeni after his release from prison occasioned much public and media debate. Animal rights and anti-cruelty proponents raised concerns about how the animal was killed, claiming that the action constituted cruelty, and transgressed anti-cruelty laws. In response, others claimed that such practices are a fundamental part of the culture of some groups in South Africa, essential to their sense of identity, and as such should not be interfered with. This incident highlights two contentious trends in current normative ethical debate. On the one hand, there have been growing calls for more ethical treatment of animals, for some animals, at least, to be accorded some value as objects of moral consider- ation, and even for animals to be understood as possessing rights. On the other hand, in an increasingly multicultural context, many call for stronger measures to ensure the protection of minority or disadvantaged cultures against the encroachment of more dominant cultures. Appeals are made for special protective measures and legislation, and again, some even claim the existence of cultural rights. On a popular level, fre- 1 This article has been adapted from a research report submitted as part of my studies towards the Master of Arts in Applied Ethics for Professionals at Wits University. I wish to express my gratitude to my su- pervisor, Brian Penrose, for his invaluable assistance, and to Thaddeus Metz for his considerable help in preparing the paper for publication.