Negotiated coercion: Thoughts about Involuntary Treatment in Mental Health. By: John L. Owen and Melissa Floyd-Pickard Owen, J. & Floyd, M. R. (2010). Negotiated coercion: Thoughts about Involuntary Treatment in Mental Health. Journal of Ethics and Social Welfare, 4(3), 297-300. This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version of Record, has been published in the Journal of Ethics and Social Welfare [2010] [copyright Taylor & Francis], available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17496535.2010.516131. Abstract: This article, written by a service user/mental health advocate and an academic/ practitioner, explores the concept of ‘negotiated coercion’ as a way to frame involuntary treatment that acknowledges its coercive essence, yet advances suggestions to maximize negotiation with consumers. coercion | involuntary mental health | mental health | social work | social welfare | Keywords: ethics | mental health hospitalization | involuntary commitment Article: This paper illustrates a conversation that the authors have on an ongoing basis. The first author, John, is a consumer advocate and himself a ‘survivor’ of involuntary crisis hospitalizations, and due to intervening medical issues left just two papers short of a Yale law degree. The second author, Melissa, is an academic and mental health advocate who often writes in the area of mental illness and involuntary treatment. The two met about six years ago and have collaborated on policy work, academic presentations, and writing projects. They decided to commit some of their discussions about involuntary treatment to paper in hopes that it will stimulate others to continually revisit this ethically complex, easily abused mental health practice. While there are no easy answers in this area, the authors do offer some practical ideas for mitigating the coercive aspects of involuntary mental health treatment. The involuntary commitment process is theoretically reserved for individuals who present a threat either to themselves or others. In practice, this definition calls for the exercise of considerable discretionary judgment manifested through an arguably flawed due process model, such that individuals subject to commitment may range from the genuinely psychotic to those whose eccentricities have made them nuisances, with a considerable gray area in between. It should be noted that evidence in such procedures is not subject to cross-examination by the affected individuals or even open for inspection, and that publicly provided representation, at least in the United States, is quite minimal at best, often involving only a five-minute interview with the appointed attorney. This cursory decision-making process may give rise to exaggeration