JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE EDUCATION  Volume 9  Number 2  Winter 2010 6 Twitter and the Public Choice Course: A Pedagogical Vignette on Political Information Technology Cara A. Burgess 1 , Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. 2 , and Rand W. Ressler 3 Abstract Given the paucity of undergraduate textbooks in public choice, instructors often look for innovative approaches and unique examples when teaching undergraduate courses in public choice economics. This essay offers a pedagogical vignette for undergraduate courses in public choice that deals with the technological development in political information represented by “tweeting.” Twitter offers mobile communications services that some representatives use to boost their stock of political reputation capital. “Share and discover what's happening ri ght now, anywhere in the world.” (twitter.com) Introduction A recent pedagogical essay by Mixon (2010) points out that the paucity of undergraduate textbooks in public choice begs for innovative approaches to teaching undergraduate courses in public choice economics. In this regard, Mixon (2010) provides an "economics in the movies" approach to discussing bureaucracies in undergraduate courses in public choice economics. Specifically, it offers some movie scenes from Conspiracy and Valkyrie that can be integrated into a discussion of Breton and Wintrobe's (1982 and 1986) modern theory of bureaucracy. This essay augments Mixon (2010) by offering a pedagogical vignette that can enhance part of the content or subject matter of a traditional undergraduate public choice course. Background Discussion As Sass (2004: 17) states, formal development of the choice between direct democracy and representative democracy is owed to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), who identified both the external costs and decision-making costs associated collective decision-making. The first of these include costs imposed on an individual by the actions of others, while the second represent the costs one incurs as a result of his or her participation in collective decision- making process (Sass, 2004: 17). Of course, public choice economists have been instrumental in developing the understanding that representatives seek to maximize their own utility, and vote accordingly. As a result, voting outcomes may be far removed from the preferences of constituents. This potential divergence exposes voters to losses from decisions made by their representatives (Sass, 2004). To the two costs above, public choice economists have added agency costs, which represent the costs incurred by voters in monitoring and constraining representative behavior plus the net cost of undesired representative actions that remain (Sass, 1992). Dating back to Downs (1957), public choice economists have viewed voters as being rationally ignorant. That is, voters realize that the probability of casting a decisive vote in a major election is infinitesimal, while at the same 1 The Laffer Center for Global Economic Growth, Mercer University, 1400 Coleman Avenue, Macon, GA 31207. 2 D. Abbott Turner College of Business & Computer Science, Columbus State University, 4225 University Avenue, Columbus, GA 31907. 3 Corresponding Author. Department of Economics and Finance, B.I. Moody, III College of Business Administration, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 104 University Circle, Lafayette, LA 70504, Tel (337) 482-6666, e-mail: rwr5011@louisiana.edu.