263 10 early continental philosophy of science Babette Babich During the years leading up to and ater 1890–1930, the continental concep- tion of science had a far broader scope than the notion of science today. Even today, the German term Wissenschat embraces not only the natural and the social sciences, including economics, 1 but also the full panoply of the so-called humanities, including the theoretical study of art and theology, that were impor- tant in the nineteenth century for, among other things, the formation of the life sciences. 2 Philosophy itself was also counted as a science and was, in its phenomenological articulation, nothing less than the science of scientiic origins or “original science” – the “Urwissenschat” – as Martin Heidegger deined it in 1919, 3 following his own intensive engagement with Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations. It is also crucial for any discussion of continental philosophy of science between 1890 and 1930 to emphasize that these were in Churchill’s words, “precarious times,” times of technological and social change and of revolution, scientiic and political. In a positive relection on the transformations of this period, Heidegger refers, as will Husserl later, to the “crisis of philosophy as 1. See E. Haeckel, Systematische Phylogenie: Entwurf eines natürlichen Systems der Organismen auf Grund ihrer Stammesgeschichte (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1894–1896). 2. See B. Kleeberg, “God-Nature Progressing: Natural heology in German Monism,” Science in Context 20(3) (2007), as well as M. Di Gregorio, From Here to Eternity: Ernst Haeckel and Scientiic Faith (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), and B. Gladigow, “Pantheismus und Naturmystik,” in Die Trennung von Natur und Geist, R. Bubner (ed.) (Munich: Fink, 1990). 3. M. Heidegger, Towards the Deinition of Philosophy, T. Sadler (trans.) (London: Continuum, 2000), 3, 11f. See for a broader discussion, T. Kisiel, Heidegger’s Way of hought (London: Continuum, 2002), 17f.