Synthese (2022) 200:0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03541-0 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Truthmaking for Meinongians Maciej Sendlak 1 Received: 5 February 2021 / Accepted: 10 December 2021 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 Abstract This paper aims to introduce Meinongian Abstractionism (MA), i.e. a view on the metaphysics of truthmaking and modality. This approach is based on the notion of objectives—one of the key elements of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. In the light of it, worlds are interpreted in terms of sets of subsistent and non-subsistent objectives. This—along with Meinong’s characterization of objectives—provides a ground for possible as well as impossible worlds. One of the consequences of Meinon- gain Abstractionism is a reformulation of the relation of truthmaking in modal terms. Importantly, this reformulation avoids the problem of too-coarse grained analysis of truthmakers. This makes MA a metaphysically–oriented supporter of the so-called ‘hyperintensional revolution.’ Keywords Truthmakers · Theory of objects · Impossible worlds · Hyperintensionality The subject of this paper is the metaphysics of modality and its relation to the ques- tion of the metaphysics of truthmakers. 1 The close bond between the two is sometimes considered to negatively affect the plausibility of the latter. This is directly related to the issue of the too-coarsely grained notion of truthmakers, which results in counter- intuitive consequences. The problem seems to be grounded in particular assumptions about the relation of truthmaking (i.e., the so-called Thesis of Entailment) and the nature of worlds (i.e., restricting the domain of worlds to only possible ones). While both assumptions find some recognition among philosophers of truthmaking, they are not indispensible to a satisfactory theory of truthmakers. I aim to sketch an alternative approach to the metaphysics of modality—one which is not restricted to possible worlds, and when applied to the question of the metaphysics of truthmaking results in the rejection of the Thesis of Entailment. While this proposal 1 Thanks to Franz Berto, Philip Bricker, Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Tadeusz Ciecierski, Alessandro Gior- dani, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek, Daniel Nolan, Joanna Odrow¸ a˙ z-Sypniewska, Jacek Pa´ sniczek, Mariusz Popieluch, Pierre Saint-Germier, Diego Tajer, and the anonymous reviewers for this journal for their help- ful comments concerning the earlier versions of the paper. This material is based on the work supported by the National Science Centre (NCN), Poland (Grant No. 2016/20/S/HS1/00125). B Maciej Sendlak m.sendlak@uw.edu.pl 1 Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmie´ scie 3, 00-927 Warszawa, Poland 0123456789().: V,-vol 123