L&PS – Logic and Philosophy of Science Vol. IX, No. 1, 2011, pp. 517-522 Scientific Knowledge: Situatedness and Intersubjectivity without Standpoints Maria Cristina Amoretti University of Genoa, Italy e-mail: cristina.amoretti@unige.it Nicla Vassallo University of Genoa, Italy e-mail: nicla.vassallo@unige.it © The Authors 2011. Published by L&PS – Logic and Philosophy of Science http://www2.units.it/~episteme — ISSN: 1826-1043 1. Introduction 2. On standpoints 3. Without standpoints ABSTRACT. We have already argued not only that essentialism is detrimental for epistemologies and philosophies of sciences, as well as sciences themselves, but also that feminist standpoint epistemol- ogies of sciences inevitably yield essentialism, or at least its unde- sirable consequences (Amoretti and Vassallo 2010a, 2011, forth- coming). Although abandoning feminist standpoint epistemologies seems to represent the straightforward solution, matters are more complicated. Some of the tenets of these epistemologies, in fact, can hardly be disregarded, such as those underlying the situatedness and intersubjectivity of scientific knowledge. Thus, the specific aim of this paper is showing that it is still possible to retain the above char- acteristics – namely situatedness and intersubjectivity – even while rejecting the very notion of standpoint. 1. Introduction Elsewhere, we have extensively argued not only that essentialism is detri- mental for epistemologies of sciences, philosophies of sciences, and sciences themselves, but also that feminist standpoint epistemologies of sciences inevi- tably yield essentialism, or at least its undesirable consequences (Amoretti