Why do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Governments? Leonard Wantchekon ¤ Yale University February 6, 2000. Abstract This paper explores the impact of natural resource dependence on democratic governance. I argue that when the state institutions are weak and budget pro- cedures either lack transparency or are discretionary, resource windfalls tend to generate incumbency advantage authoritarian governments. There is a strong empirical support for my theoretical predictions. Controlling for GDP, human capital and other possible determinants, I nd a robust and statistically signif- icant impact of resource dependence on the probability of authoritarianism . Since Norway is an outlier according to my statistical ndings, I explain why oil discoveries generated incumbency advantage and political instability in Nigeria and not in Norway. ¤ I would like to thank Nathan Jensen and Vineeta Yadav for excellent research assistance. I would also like to thank Geo¤ Garrett, Martin Gilens, Elena Kranoskutskaya, Mathias Hounkpe, Ellen Lust-Okar, Amy Poteete, Dani Rodrik, Chris Udry, James Vreeland and seminar participants at Université Laval and Université de Montréal for comments. The usual caveat applies. 1