Credible Assignments and Performance Bonuses in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game 1 Ananish Chaudhuri Department of Economics University of Auckland a.chaudhuri@auckland.ac.nz Tirnud Paichayontvijit Department of Economics University of Auckland t.paichayontvijit@auckland.ac.nz Corresponding author: Ananish Chaudhuri Department of Economics University of Auckland Owen G Glenn Building Level 6 12 Grafton Road Auckland, New Zealand Phone: 64-9-923-8307 Fax: 64-9-373-7427 E-mail: a.chaudhuri@auckland.ac.nz 1 We would like to thank the University of Auckland Research Council for providing the funds to conduct this research. We are grateful to Laura Bangun, Geoff Brooke and Miwah Van for assistance in collecting the data and to Erwann Sbai for advice about and assistance with the data analysis. We also thank seminar participants at Monash University, Melbourne University, University of Auckland, National University of Singapore, Singapore Management University, Indian School of Business and Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata as well as at a number of conferences for helpful feedback. We are responsible for all errors in the paper.