,,..-· ' ...... The Palme Commission report 42 Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region Geoffrey Wiseman The momentous changes in the Soviet Union since 1985, which led to the ending of the Cold War in Europe, and recent proposals for a new world order in the aftermath of the Gulf War, have provoked new interest in policy and academic circles about the future security order in the Asia-Pacific region. 1 In essence, the emerging debate has focused on the prospects for some kind of region-wide, political-security dialogue and, secondly, the promotion of arms control_ ~ainly through informal means such as confidence-building measures (CB Ms). It 1s m_ the context of this debate that this paper considers ways in which ideas and assumptions about 'defensiveness', often associated with the broader concept of common security, figure in the regional conversation about future security arrangements and the resolution of regional security problems. MHThe Concept of 'Common Security' in the European Debate The term common security entered the public debate in Europe following the publication in 1982 of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the chairmanship of Olof Palme, the late Swedish prime minister. 2 The report, released at a time of heightened East-West tension, emphasized common interests and the need for cooperation between adversaries to ensure survival in a world of strategic interdependence. At the same time, there was an upsurge in interest in alternative ideas about defence, ideas not widely considered in the Palme Commission report itself, which included proposals for the restructuring of strategic doctrine and force posture along demonstrably defensive or non-threatening lines: proposals variously referred to as non-provocative defence, non-offensive defence, defensive defence and conventional deterrence. All of these concepts convey a sense of'defensiveness', a broad term used here to encapsulate the emphasis accorded to defensive over offensive military preparations. These conceptual innovations should be seen against the background of worsening relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1980s; the debate about the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) which challenged the offensive assumptions of deterrence theory; the adoption by several Western European opposition parties, notably the SPD in the Federal Republic of Germany, of defence policies emphasizing a 'structural incapability of attack'; and improvements in new technologies said to favour the defensive. These developments, along with the Palme Commission report itself, gave rise to a new school of thought arguing a strategic, moral and legal case for a return to the defensive. While there is far from widespread agreement about the meaning of common security, several core elements are identifiable: • Common security typically advocates minimum nuclear deterrence. It stresses nuclear survival rather than the nuclear strategy of deterrence, especially nuclear war-fighting doctrines. While deterrence theory acknowledges inter- dependence and common interests, common security implies that they should be accorded more importance. • Cooperation with the adversary is promoted in contrast to ideas about Geoffrey Wiseman has had diplomatic postings in Stockholm, Hanoi and Brussels with the Australian foreign service and has been private secretary to the Australian foreign minister. He is currently doing private research as an SSRC-MacArthur Fellow in International Peace and Security at St. Antony's College, Oxford. ({') Oxfi1rd Unirersity Press, 1992, The Pacific Reriew Vol. 5. No. J 0951-2748/92 $3.00