Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 33 (2002) 355–372 www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa Testimony and intellectual autonomy C.A.J. Coady Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia Abstract Recent epistemology has been notable for an emphasis, or a variety of emphases, upon the social dimension of knowledge. This has provided a corrective to the heavily individualist account of knowledge previously holding sway. It acknowledges the ways in which an individ- ual is deeply indebted to the testimony of others for his or her cognitive endowments, both with respect to capacities and information. But the dominance of the individualist model was connected with a concern for the value of cognitive autonomy. It is unclear how due recog- nition of the social dimension can allow for this value. It is argued here that there are ways of construing intellectual autonomy that not only can make it consistent with these new empha- ses (in particular, with the approach to testimony favoured by the author) but also respect its status as an epistemic concept. The author’s approach is contrasted with Alvin Goldman’s recent development of an approach to social knowledge via the idea of maximising truths. This seems to leave insufficient scope for intellectual character and autonomy. So concepts of independence, mastery, intellectual self-creation and intellectual integrity are explored in order to develop a perspective on cognitive autonomy adequate to the insights of social epis- temology.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Autonomy; Testimony; Ideals; Epistemology; Mackie; Goldman 1. Introduction Much epistemology of the late twentieth century was dominated by the idea of naturalising epistemology. The phrase was Quine’s but its genesis may be found in Hume’s empiricism and in some of the impulses of the later Wittgenstein. At its best, the instinct of the naturalisers was soundly based in a certain hostility to arm- chair theorising and to philosophers dictating rules for rationality and authenticity E-mail address: t.coady@philosophy.unimelb.edu.au (C. A. J. Coady). 0039-3681/02/$ - see front matter  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII:S0039-3681(02)00004-3