The Dialogical Brain Contributions of Emotional Neurobiology to Understanding the Dialogical Self Marc D. Lewis University of Toronto Abstract. Using theory and data from emotional neurobiology, I suggest a neurally realistic model of Hermans’ dialogical self. The model is premised on Hermans’ idea of voicing and its implications for motivation, action and subjectivity. Because states of motivated attention unify brain activity, coexisting I-positions are as problematic for neuroscience as they are for psychology. To overcome this problem, I postulate an internal monologue in which the familiar I-position is subserved by an attentional system in the orbitofrontal cortex, linked with nearby affective and premotor areas. This internal monologue is fueled by gist-like perceptual expectancies of an- other’s response, and it perpetuates and adjusts itself by updating these expectancies. A second I-position may be underpinned by an attentional system in the anterior cingulate cortex and its connections. These two attentional systems are partly independent, and they compete for control based on changes in emotional content and intensity. Thus, switching activation between them may account for semi-autonomous, but not coexisting, I-positions. Key Words: brain, emotion, expectancy, internal dialogue, subjectivity Mary is alone in the kitchen, cooking for tonight’s guests. She goes about the routine tasks of chopping and mixing, with little awareness of anything except a vague pleasure in familiar actions and anticipation of a tasty outcome. Then she notices that she put the stove on too high, and the rice will soon be ruined. There is not enough time to start the rice again if all is to be ready when the guests arrive. She notices a change in her mood, a loss of pleasure and increase in anxiety, but this is expectable under the circumstances. Then, as she rushes around trying to repair the situation, she decides to stop and ‘look inward’, as the yoga teacher suggests, and notices that there are phrases in her mind: ‘What do you expect . . . I can’t do everything on my own. It’s not my fault.’ And she notices that these phrases are directed at someone, but she isn’t sure who it is. It seems a bit like her mother, who is about to arrive, or her husband, who does not appreciate how Theory & Psychology Copyright © 2002 Sage Publications. Vol. 12(2): 175–190 [0959-3543(200204)12:2;175–190;022628]