The Content Validity of Cognitively Oriented Tests: Commentary on Schmidt (2012) Robert E. Ployhart Management Department, Darla Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA. ployhart@moore.sc.edu Schmidt (International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 20, 1–13 (2012)) argues that it is possible for scores based on measures of general cognitive ability (GCA) to have content validity evidence. This commentary examines this argument further. I first decompose the various lines of validity evidence that may exist for GCA scores. Next, I consider whether GCA scores can have content validity evidence and whether they cannot. I conclude with several observations about the meaning of content validity within GCA research and prac- tice. The bottom line is that although I agree with Schmidt that GCA scores can have content validity evidence, I am not sure such evidence tells us much about the overall validity of GCA. 1. Introduction S chmidt’s (2012) central argument is that it is possible to acquire evidence and support for the content valid- ity of general cognitive ability (GCA). He further con- tends that,‘. . . in the domains of cognitive skills, aptitudes, and abilities, test development procedures that yield content validity also yield criterion-related validity’ (p. 3). The paper makes a variety of other points that are not as central to the core focus but are nevertheless worth some reflection. This may be the most boring commentary you have read in some time because I find myself in agreement with Schmidt’s basic point – GCA can have content validity evidence. As I will try to explain, to argue otherwise simply does not make sense professionally, technically, theoretically, or practically.At the same time, the role of content validity, as one piece of evidence in the broader accumulation of evidence for construct validity, needs closer examination. In today’s world, with the mass of data and knowledge we have about jobs, work, workers, individual differences, and validity, do the classic distinc- tions (and relationships) among content, criterion- related, and construct validity make sense? Is there an instance where GCA could not have content validity? This commentary will provide some thoughts on these issues. The following subsections will tackle key points and arguments raised by Schmidt (2012) and present some additional thinking and discussion around them. Let us begin by clarifying terms. 2. Scores and validity Most of the phenomena and individual differences of interest to applied psychologists are latent in nature. We cannot directly see or observe GCA, but neither can we directly observe conscientiousness, collectivism, or work values. In this sense, I agree with Schmidt (2012) that ‘mental processes’ are vital for virtually every type of work behavior, even those that may not be con- scious. Mental processes are even relevant for those individual differences that we often term ‘noncognitive,’ such as personality or attitudes. For example, Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) cognitive–affective personality system is based heavily on the idea that traits are systematic forms of cognitive processing (see McCrae & Costa, 1996; Mat- thews, 1997 for very similar points). The question is not about mental processing but rather the nature of that processing and whether it is focused on adding digits, interpreting social situations, or expressing affect toward others and objects. Mental processing underlies all con- structs of interest to industrial/organizational (I/O) psy- chologists, and hence, the measures and indicators used to represent those constructs.The Uniform Guidelines’(1978) treatment of mental processes is simply out of date. However, I wish Schmidt (2012) would have made a clearer distinction between indicators (scores) of GCA Author note: I thank Michael C. Campion for his help with the reference section. International Journal of Selection and Assessment Volume 20 Number 1 March 2012 © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St., Malden, MA, 02148, USA