Boran Berčić, Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka Rey's meta-atheism 1. The Thesis In this paper I would like to make a few comments on Georges Rey's view on the nature of religious beliefs. I am generally very sympathetic with his view, and believe it’s essentially correct. However, I think that it contains some problematic claims of minor importance that could be improved (sections 2 and 3 below), and that there are some important features of religiousness that a satisfactory and complete explanation of it should embrace (sections 4 and 5). The core of Rey's view is the thesis of "meta-atheism", the claim that: Despite appearances, most Western adults who’ve been exposed to standard science and claim to believe in God are self-deceived; at some level they know full well the belief is false. This is my hunch about what passes as “religious belief”, although I expect the other issues about self-ignorance, expression, and intended audience may also play a role. 1 This seems a reasonable explanation of at least some (so-called) religious beliefs: a thought that God loves all of his children may help those who are in fact not loved; a thought that God knows everything may help when virtue does not pay; a thought that God helps may help those who do not have enough courage or self- confidence; a thought that God forgives everything may help sinners; etc. It is certainly reasonable to assume that being religious may have psychological and perhaps even evolutionary advantages. However, this is an ultimately empirical hypothesis, and a final verdict is up to psychology and neuroscience. Of course, the question is how much of religion can be explained by appeal to self-deception. As Rey himself notes, other factors probably play a role too, e.g., intended audience, social acceptance. Personally I would put more weight on the latter factors, but this is again an ultimately empirical question. Let me now focus on the details of the view that I find problematic. 2. Does the atheist commit the "philosophy fallacy"? In spite of denying that meta-atheism implies first-order atheism, Rey quite convincingly argues in favor of first-order atheism. Specifically, he argues that atheism is a commonsense position, not a result of complicated philosophical argumentation: The reasons for atheism are not dependent upon any subtle or arcane philosophical issues, but merely on the sort of common sense that is used and supported by ordinary reasoning about most any non-religious topic (this recourse to philosophy where common sense will suffice I call the “philosophy fallacy,” which seems to me endemic to religious discussions). I agree with Rey that atheism is a common sense position. However, I do not think that the philosophy fallacy is endemic to religious discussion. Indeed, I do not think it is a fallacy at all. Rey's idea is that the atheist does not need sophisticated arguments, and that common sense is enough. This is the intuition that underlies the so-called “presumption of atheism,” in my opinion a very strong and natural argument in favor of atheism developed by Michael Scriven (1966) and Anthony Flew (1972). The atheist claims that