1 On the Alleged Incoherence of Consequentialism by Robert Mckim and Peter Simpson Joseph Boyle, John Finnis and German Grisez have advanced versions of an argument which, they believe, shows that consequentialism is incoherent. 1 It is incoherent, they contend, because it cannot account for the possibility of making wrong choices. Let us call this argument, for convenience, ACI (argument that consequentialism is incoherent). Finnis and Grisez prefer to talk about proportionalism rather than consequentialism, but this is a terminological matter and makes little deference to the issue. Proportionalism is described by Finnis as the view that one should “[compare] the benefits and harms proposed by alternative possible choices (whether the choice be of commitment to rules or ways of life, or of a one-off action), and make that choice which promises to yield a better proportion of benefit to harm than any available alternative choice.” 2 He states the ACI as follows: [On] the proportionalist explanations of 'right' and 'wrong', wrong choice would be not merely wrong but unintelligible and, as a choice, impossible. One can choose only what appears to one to be good; but if, as proportionalists claim, (i) 'wrong' entails 'yielding (or promising) less good,' and (ii) there are choices which can be identified as yielding or promising less good than some 1 John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington DC, 1983 ), pp. 89-90; Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus (Chicago, 1983), pp. 48-49, 150, 152-54, 160-61. Joseph Boyle indicated his support for this line of argument in the course of a lecture delivered at the NRH sponsored Summer Institute on the ethical thought of Thomas Aquinas which was organized by Ralph Mclnerny at the University of Notre Dame, June, 1985, and in an unpublished piece entitled “Refutation of Consequentialism in Syllogistic Form”. Both authors of this article were participants in that Summer Institute. 2 Fundamentals of Ethics, pp. 86-87.