196 Te Journal of American History June 2021 and murdering in the assertion of Protestant American values. Historians familiar with Eddy’s role in pre- paring the ground for Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in November 1942, are, as Sutton points out, less familiar with Protestant Christianity’s part in motivating the actions of Eddy and his peers. Even adherents of the John Birch Society may not be entirely familiar with the fact that their organization’s namesake was an oss spy against the Japanese with a Christian proselytizing heritage before Chinese com- munists tortured and killed him in 1945. Birch’s parents were Presbyterian missionar- ies and millennialists. In 1941, Eddy told his wife he was to be a “‘Lawrence of Arabia’ to promote Allied propaganda among the na- tives” and had spent the frst ffteen years of his life in Syria, also the progeny of Presbyte- rian missionaries (p. 7). Herman was the son of a Lutheran pastor, and the fourth spy, Pen- rose, boasted a father who was a member of the “Yale [University] Band” of missionaries. All four were formidable exponents of moral certainty. Sutton’s account of the four missionaries’ activities in World War II is well researched and entertainingly written. He has a sharp eye for instructive parallels. Rabbi Nelson Glueck was an archaeologist who spied for the oss in the Holy Land. Tough he declined a Law- rence of Arabia role, he was a non-Zionist who had good relations with Muslims, giving him value in the view of oss director William J. Donovan. Father Felix Morlion was a Flemish priest who spied for the oss in the Vatican. Te oss dubbed Morlion’s Catholic operation “Pil- grim’s Progress,” a nomenclated absurdity that shows how John Bunyon’s Puritan spirit held the oss hierarchy in its grip. Such details dem- onstrate the value of Double Crossed, less as a contribution to the growing body of literature on intelligence ethics than as a rich and intel- ligent source of evidence. Rhodri Jefreys-Jones University of Edinburgh Edinburgh, Scotland doi: 10.1093/jahist/jaab031 Global Development: A Cold War History. By Sara Lorenzini. (Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 2019. xiv, 275 pp. $29.95.) Tis is a wide-ranging, transnational history of “development” during the Cold War era from the perspective of both powerful donor coun- tries and “Tird World” recipient countries. One of the book’s most valuable contributions is this reframing, in which the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union are all in one boat, using foreign aid to further their own political and economic agendas, while leaders of recipient, target countries were consum- ing that aid to further their own political and economic agendas. Tis is a masterful work, whose main take-away is that neither propo- nents of foreign aid, who see it as a benefcent way to raise the stock of humanity, nor its detractors, who see it as a hegemonic tool to enforce empire, understand how thoroughly foreign aid and “development” failed to meet intended goals—whether for improvement or for control. Te author makes three central arguments: (1) that the Cold War was fundamental in shaping global aspirations and ideologies of development; (2) that the role of the (national) state was crucial in the internationalist concep- tion of “development,” and that development projects served the nationalist interests of both superpower donor nations and recipient na- tions, whose leaders used nationalism to gain popular support for the aid; and (3) that devel- opmental institutions, in their attempts to cre- ate a universal concept of development, were unable to overcome national, political, and cultural divisions. Based on archives in a va- riety of international cities, including those of the European Union, the World Bank, and the United Nations, the book examines how de- velopment projects altered local realities, and how the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union used aid and development to win hearts and minds and, in the case of Europe, atone for imperialism. While the superpowers hoped aid would lead to greater security, it actually created autocrats and instability; in short, se- curity and aid did not go together as planned. Te author’s research on aid programs of- fered by Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Eastern Bloc countries ofers a Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jah/article/108/1/196/6295236 by KIM Hohenheim user on 25 April 2022