Associative Solidarity, Relational Goods, and Autonomy for Refugees: What Does it Mean to Stand in Solidarity with Refugees? Christine Straehle Introduction Solidarity is a concept that has been applied only sparsely in the discussion of cosmopolitan justice so far. 1 If it is applied to the cosmopolitan sphere, then it has been mostly understood as “as a relationship among individuals or among groups or associations. In this use, people are understood as potentially feeling solidarity with the suffering of others or as standing with them in their struggles.” 2 The concept of solidarity has also not seen much attention in the discussion of migra- tion justice, both immigration and emigration. Yet thinking about refugees and thinking about solidarity allows to link the international and the domestic debates since asylum-seekers who ask for refuge transcend the international—national divide. Refugees, in other words, are an excellent test case to evaluate different conceptions of solidarity in political philosophy. In this paper, I want to do two things: first, I want to investigate what ac- count of solidarity can plausibly explain any obligations toward refugees. In lib- eral-egalitarian writing, solidarity has often been motivated to support the social welfare state—it becomes then one of the necessities of that state. 3 I will juxta- pose the definition of solidarity as social solidarity supported by David Miller, for instance, to that of political solidarity. This conceptualization has recently been proposed by Avery Kolers. 4 In Miller’s view, the notion of a “duty of soli- darity” refers to the particularistic duties that flow from what is shared, namely a national identity and common belonging to a group. Kolers, starts from the prem- ise that linguistically, a duty of solidarity could also refer to the duty to engage in practices that create what is shared, that create the community among which solidarity can be demanded. To “stand in solidarity” is then the willingness to en- gage in certain practices of sharing or defining a solidaristic community. I argue that neither of these accounts of social and political solidarity quite captures the concept of solidarity. One of the important dimensions of the promise of asylum is the idea of providing for conditions of agency and autonomy among refugees. Thus, my starting point is the premise that all human beings have a basic need to stand in particularistic relationships with others, for their autonomy-based needs to be met. © 2020 The Authors. Journal of Social Philosophy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. DOI: 10.1111/josp.12339 JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 0 No. 0, Spring 2020, 1–17.