RESEARCHERS’ ROUNDTABLE “BENDING” EVIDENCE FOR A CAUSE: SCHOLAR-ADVOCACY BIAS IN FAMILY LAW Robert E. Emery, Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, Janet R. Johnston, JoAnne L. Pedro-Carroll, Marsha Kline Pruett, Michael Saini, and Irwin Sandler There are a number of salient public policy issues in the family law field that have invoked impassioned policy debates on a recurrent basis. In the absence of a body of research to address these critical concerns, advocates under the guise of social sci- ence scholarship have exacerbated the confusion and controversy by construing the scant available research evidence to justify their own ends, without regard to the relevance, quality, utility, and limitations of the studies. This is one of two articles on this problem that we have named “scholar-advocacy bias.” In this article, we discuss the difference between truth in social science and truth in law. We identify common ways in which social science researchers and reviewers of research—wittingly or unwit- tingly—can become advocates for ideological positions and social policies at the expense of being balanced reporters of research evidence as illustrated by recent debates about overnight parenting of infants and toddlers. We also consider how adherence to established scientific principles and methods prevents the misuse of research in this way. Key Points for the Family Court Community:  Scholar-advocacy bias, the intentional or unintentional use of social science research to legitimize advocacy claims, is a problem that practitioners and policy makers must recognize and guard against in family law.  Because of different methods of pursuing and establishing truth in science and the law, ironically, the less rhetorically convincing argument often represents science most faithfully.  Practitioners—and scientists—must guard against using various rhetorical tactics that bend research evidence, for example, the rules of science dictate that we must prove our hypotheses; others need not disprove them. Keywords: Advocacy Research; Scholar-Advocacy Bias; and Social Science Research. Thomas Huxley famously pointed to “The great tragedy of Science - the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.” Huxley’s “tragedy” is tongue-in-cheek. He delighted in empirical scien- ce’s triumph of evidence over ideas. Our present concern is the opposite of Huxley’s: facts murdered, or merely maimed, in the name of a cause, even a worthy one. The name of this enterprise is not Sci- ence, but “Scholar-Advocacy Bias” masquerading in the name of Research. We define scholar- advocacy bias as the intentional or unintentional use of the language, methods, and approaches of social science research, as well as one’s status as an expert, for the purpose and/or outcome of legiti- mizing advocacy claims at the cost of misrepresenting research findings. We argue that scholar- advocacy bias goes largely unacknowledged in family law. Advocacy and research in family matters are terms that embody an essential tension between the pursuit of truth in law and science. Truth in the law is about persuasion, using the legal rules of evi- dence to advocate for your side and ultimately to convince a judge or jury of the truth of your case. Truth in science is about public demonstration, designing research procedures that others can use objectively to replicate your findings. Both pursuits of truth serve very worthy purposes. Establishing what is social science evidence is complicated within an adversarial legal system where the legal Correspondence: holtzwor@indiana.edu, mpruett@smith.edu, johnston527@sbcglobal.net, michael.saini@utoronto.ca, jpcarroll4peace@gmail.com, ree@virginia.edu *All authors contributed equally to this work. FAMILY COURT REVIEW, Vol. 54 No. 2, April 2016 134–149 V C 2016 Association of Family and Conciliation Courts