Hupolêpsis, Doxa, and Epistêmê in Aristotle C. D. C. Reeve University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Abstract In Aristotle’s views on cognition a series of terms – hupolêpsis, doxa, and epistêmê – play key roles. But it has not been noticed that each of these comes in two kinds – one unqualified (haplôs) and the other qualified. When these and their interrelations are properly explored, a deeply systematic picture of cognition emerges, in which doxa is best understood as ‘belief’, hupolêpsis as ‘supposition’, and epistêmê (‘scientific knowledge’) as a sort of belief, so that – contrary to orthodoxy – we can have belief and knowledge of the same things at the same time. Many of these conclusions are shown to mark a continuity with Plato, in that neither thinker, it is argued, holds a so- called ‘two-worlds’ picture of cognition. Keywords: Aristotle, Plato, doxa, epistêmê, hupolêpsis, haplôs, hôs epi to polu, ‘two-worlds’ view This paper, as its title no doubt suggests, is an exploration of Aristotle’s epistemology which focuses on three core interrelated notions – hupolêpsis, doxa, and epistêmê. 1 My claim is that when these are properly understood, a new picture emerges of that epistemology, different in important respects from the standard one, in particular as regards the objects of doxa and epistêmê, the nature of the states themselves, the question of whether epistêmê is a kind of doxa, and of whether one can have both doxa and epistêmê of the same thing at the same time. Before getting to Aristotle, however, it is useful to start with Plato. Ancient Philosophy Today: DIALOGOI 3.2 (2021): 172–199 DOI: 10.3366/anph.2021.0051 © Edinburgh University Press www.euppublishing.com/anph