Development, reliability, and validity of the Moral Identity Questionnaire Jessica E. Black a, ⁎, William M. Reynolds b a University of Oklahoma, USA b Humboldt State University, USA abstract article info Article history: Received 13 January 2016 Received in revised form 9 March 2016 Accepted 17 March 2016 Available online xxxx As areas of psychology focus more on how people make moral choices, there is a need for psychometrically sound instruments that include meaningful components of moral cognition. The purpose of this research was the devel- opment of a measure of moral identity that would encompass both integrity and the importance of morality to self-identity. In two large samples, we developed the Moral Identity Questionnaire (MIQ), and established inter- nal consistency, test–retest reliability, and evidence of validity, including confirmatory factorial analysis, and cor- relations with current measures of morality. In summary, the MIQ, which measures the salience of moral integrity and moral self independently of political orientation or gender, provided scores that were reliable and valid, with strong correlations to measures of similar constructs. © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Moral identity Scale development Confirmatory factor analysis Measurement invariance 1. Introduction The evaluation of moral decision making is limited by the fact that most current measures of this broad construct are related to emotional reactions (e.g., Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011) or have problematic psychometric integrity. This paper presents two studies that described the development of a reliable and valid measure of moral identity. This measure, the Moral Identity Questionnaire, assesses two basic com- ponents of moral identity, those of moral integrity and moral self. We consider both to be components of a broader model of moral cognition, or the conscious and unconscious mental processes that determine whether a given action is right or wrong according to the prevailing moral paradigm. Most moral theories adhere to a basic precept of avoiding harm to other persons within the community (Graham et al., 2010). Gray, Young, and Waytz (2012) simplify moral situations to a dy- adic relationship between an agent who either harms or helps, and a person (“patient”) who suffers or benefits. We adopt a similar approach by centering our definition of morality on decisions or judgments that can affect the well-being of another person or persons, and the degree to which these judgments define the moral self. Our methodology re- flects the assumption that persons have some self-awareness (meta- cognition) of moral judgments and actions, and a degree of control over them. 1.1. Measuring morality Efforts to measure moral judgment over the past fifty years have gen- erally emphasized the importance of a rational, self-aware deliberator. Kohlberg (1971) laid the groundwork for research on what has come to be viewed as the standard model (Walker, 2002), which describes moral development as a progression through six stages loosely corre- sponding to Piaget's preoperational and operational developmental levels (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Instruments based on Kohlberg's theory and method (cf. Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby, 1982; Lind, 2008; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999) typically assess how and why people make moral judgments based on responses to a series of moral dilemmas, as- suming rational decision-making. These scales are often difficult to score and tend to be constructed to confirm their own biases (see Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007). Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, and Pastorelli (1996) provided a theory and a method for assessing moral disengagement, but focused on explaining deviation from morally responsible behavior. Self-report measures such as Bandura et al.'s (1996) Moral Disengagement Scale and Schwartz's (1968, 1973) Ascrip- tion of Responsibility Scale suppose a rational agent who can choose to accept moral responsibility (Schwartz, 1968, 1973). Measures of moral development predicated on Kohlberg's theory and those that assess moral responsibility emphasize deliberate decision-making, but do less to address the motivating factors that make a choice moral. Theories of moral psychology based on personality or moral identity are perhaps better able to explain such motivation. Blasi (1983, 1980) highlights the inability of the Kohlberg model to ac- count for the discrepancy between moral judgment and action, and out- lines a theory that proposes consistency as the overriding moral motivation. Blasi's Self-Model supposes a conscious deliberator that Personality and Individual Differences 97 (2016) 120–129 ⁎ Corresponding author at: University of Oklahoma, Department of Psychology, 455 Lindsey Street, Dale Hall Tower, Room 740, Norman, OK 73071, USA. E-mail addresses: Jessica.Black@ou.edu (J.E. Black), wr9@humboldt.edu (W.M. Reynolds). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.03.041 0191-8869/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Personality and Individual Differences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid