The Journal of Socio-Economics 37 (2008) 1248–1265 Can incentives for research harm research? A business schools’ tale Damien Besancenot a, , Radu Vranceanu b a LEM and the University of Paris 2, 92 rue d’Assas, 75006 Paris, France b ESSEC Business School, Department of Economics, BP 50105, 95021 Cergy, France Accepted 1 December 2006 Abstract This paper develops a simple model of the market for academic publications in business and economics. The supply of papers is presented as the outcome of a game between researchers and schools’ deans under imperfect information about the quality of a given paper. The demand for papers brings into the picture the editorial selection process. After defining the equilibrium of this market, the model allows us to study the consequences of more powerful incentives for publication in major journals. It turns out that too large bonuses, as implemented by business schools in the recent years, might bring about several unpleasant consequences, such as a drop in the quality of major journals, a decline in the number of top-tier publications realized by leading research institutions and a fall in the expected compensation of top researchers. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: A11; M21; D89 Keywords: Publication market; Academic journals; Incentives; Business schools; Rankings 1. Introduction Academic journals in business and economics gather now hundreds of titles, and their number is growing steadily. For instance, in 1994 the Judge Institute at the Cambridge University compiled a list of 1431 journals in management and social sciences. Today, the ISI Web of Science surveys about 1800 journals in social sciences. However, among this myriad of journals only a few can be considered as “major” or “top-tier” given their world wide notoriety and ability to shape future research. One very demanding classification would count about six such leading publications Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: besancenot@u-paris2.fr (D. Besancenot), vranceanu@essec.fr (R. Vranceanu). 1053-5357/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.082