Management knowledge and knowledge management: realism and forms of truth John Mingers 1 1 Kent Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury, U.K. Correspondence: John Mingers, Kent Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7PE, U.K. Tel: þ 44 1227 824008; E-mail: j.mingers@kent.ac.uk Received: 24 July 2007 Accepted: 15 October 2007 Abstract This paper addresses the issue of truth and knowledge in management generally and knowledge management in particular. Based on ideas from critical realism and critical theory, it argues against the monovalent conceptualization of knowledge implicitly or explicitly held by many authors and aims instead to develop a characterization that recognizes the rich and varied ways in which human beings may be said ‘to know’. It points out and conceptualizes a fundamental dimension of knowledge that is generally ignored or cursorily treated within the literature, that is, ‘truth’. It identifies four forms of knowledge – propositional, experiential, performative and epistemological – and explores their characteristics, especially in terms of truth and validity. It points out some implications for knowledge management. Knowledge Management Research & Practice (2008) 6, 62–76. doi:10.1057/palgrave.kmrp.8500161 Keywords: knowledge management; knowledge; information; critical realism; critical theory; truth Introduction Although knowledge management (KM) has established itself as a bona fide subject both in practice (Grover & Davenport, 2001) and in the academic world (Schultze & Leidner, 2002), there has been, and remains, consider- able debate about the fundamental concepts of ‘knowledge’, ‘information’ and even of ‘data’. In some ways this should not surprise us as the same thing may be said at the level of management research as a whole. Management as a discipline has the aim of generating valid knowledge but has been schizophrenic as to how this should be achieved at least since the time of Burrell & Morgan’s (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. Different paradigms or, as Deetz (1996) terms them, discourses make radically different assumptions in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology, thus generating competing views as to what might be taken as knowledge. It has become commonplace to identify at least four such discourses – positivism (empiricism), interpretivism (construction- ism), critical and postmodern (Jackson, 2000, 2005). It can be argued that the stand-off between positivism and interpreti- vism has been ameliorated (Mingers, 2004a) in favour of some form of pluralism, either one that simply accepts the validity of different paradigms (e.g., Robey, 1996; Jackson, 2000) or one that seeks actively to combine research approaches (e.g., Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Goles & Hirschheim, 2000; Mingers, 2001a). However, where does this leave the question of knowledge? Are there different forms of knowledge depending on the paradigm in use? And how does this relate to truth, which is supposedly an essential characteristic of knowledge as opposed to mere belief? Knowledge Management Research & Practice (2008) 6, 62–76 & 2008 Operational Research Society Ltd. All rights reserved 1477–8238/08 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/kmrp