Socio-Economic Planning Sciences xxx (xxxx) xxx Please cite this article as: David Carfí, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2020.100807 Available online 6 February 2020 0038-0121/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Socio-Economic Planning Sciences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/seps Invited paper Coopetitive games for environmental sustainability: Climate change and decision global policies David Carfí a,b,∗ , Alessia Donato b , Maria Incoronata Fredella c , Massimo Squillante d a Department of Mathematics, University of California Riverside, 900 University Ave, Riverside, CA 92521, USA b Department of Economics, University of Messina, 75 Via dei Verdi, 98122 Messina, Italy c European Multidisciplinary Seafloor and water-column Observatory European Research Consortium (EMSO ERIC), Italy d Department DEMM, University of Sannio, Piazza Guerrazzi, 82100 Benevento, Italy ARTICLE INFO Keywords: Environmental sustainability Climate change Coopetitive games Green-growth indicator Green technologies Paris agreement COP21 ABSTRACT In this work, we propose and analyze a coopetitive model for the Climate Change environmental sustainability: a global duopoly type game structure, involving a generic type of green technological good. Our model allows to select certain strategy profile solutions within a continuous horizon of possible global scenarios, in the context of the Paris agreement COP21 and after Trump’s decision to abandon the agreement itself. More specifically, we construct a parametric coopetitive game with two great actors, US and the group of countries which still agree to COP21. The two actors of our duopoly game compete on the global market by producing and selling green technological goods (for example: electric cars, electric airplanes, hydrogen cars, solar panels, low impact batteries for smart houses, electric cars or self phones, and so on). Our multi- dimensional coopetitive model suggests possible cooperative strategies in order to improve the efficiency and strength of the actions enforced by the countries to mitigate the Climate Change catastrophic risk at the level of its causes and effects. 1. Introduction In 2018 Romer and Nordhaus received the Nobel Prize for work on Climate change and growth because they ‘significantly broadened the scope of economic analysis by constructing quantitative models that explain how the market economy interacts with nature and knowledge’. Against climate change and environmental issues, the green econ- omy, that is defined as an economy with low carbon emissions, efficient use of resources and social inclusivity (according to the United Nations Environment Program), represents a key tool. A survey of green econ- omy and related questions is offered in [1] and [2], whereas Georgeson et al. review the concept of global green economy [3]. In [4], we find an exam of the effects determined by technology policies. Anbumozhi et al. offer an analysis of the concept of low-carbon green growth and state- of-the-art policies in emerging economies in order to attain regional cooperation for green growth [5]. Green economy for sustainable de- velopment at a global level is emphasized by Carfì and Schilirò [6] and by Vargas et al. [7]. Maler adopts a game-theory model based on the theory of cooperative games for analyze international environmental agreements and environmental problems [8]. Barret, instead, discusses global environmental problems applying concepts of game theory to explore the properties of international environmental agreements [9]. ∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Mathematics, University of California Riverside, 900 University Ave, Riverside, CA 92521, USA. E-mail addresses: davidcarfi@gmail.com, dcarfi@unime.it (D. Carfí). For what concerns the Paris agreement (see [10]), Kompas et al. apply a large-scale and intertemporal computational general equilib- rium (CGE) model to account for the various effects of global warming (e.g., loss in agricultural productivity, sea level rise, and health ef- fects) on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and levels for 139 countries over the long-term. These authors estimate the economic gains from complying with the Paris agreement for 139 countries, concluding that such gains are substantial [11]. We follow this line of analysis and thought for construction of our model and the choice of possible Pareto solutions. However, our paper creates a precise game- theory dynamic path, by applying the notion of ‘coopetition’, which generates a parametric curve of non-cooperative games with a tuning participation level determined by the carbon emissions of each country. The idea of ‘coopetition’ was devised by Brandenburger and Nalebuff that argued that game theory can be useful for analyzing coopetitive situations [12,13]. In this regard, Carfì and Okura discussed the use of game-theory models in coopetition studies [14] and Carfì applied coopetition to several economic issues [15–18]. We construct a game theory coopetitive model with two actors, USA and the group of countries which still agree to COP21, following the initial idea proposed in [19]. The two actors of our duopoly game https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2020.100807 Received 27 October 2019; Received in revised form 23 January 2020; Accepted 4 February 2020