The Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements CHRISTOPHER S. KELLEY Miami University BRYAN W. MARSHALL Miami University Signing statements have become an important device that both protects and enhances presidential power by signaling how legislation is to be implemented, offering a mechanism of electoral reward, and protecting presidential prerogatives. We offer a first cut at explaining signing statements by applying William Howell’s theory of unilateral action. The evidence shows that presidents use signing statements under conditions of gridlock, such as divided government, which erode their influence in Congress. The findings also suggest a strategic element to signing statement behavior. Presidents issue significantly more signing statements on major legislation when the policy and political stakes are greatest. The results provide insight into the theory of unilateral action and demonstrate how signing statements complement rather than contradict the Richard Neustadt view of power. The presidential bill signing statement is one of many devices that contemporary presidents have developed for use against a recalcitrant Congress, joining with the executive order, memoranda, proclamations, pocket vetoes, and primary unilateral policy devices, to name but a few (Barilleaux 1989; Cooper 2002; Mayer 2001; Spitzer 2006). In late 2005 and then in 2006, the signing statement moved from relative obscurity to cause célèbre. The reason it became a public spectacle is multifaceted. First, in December 2005, President George W. Bush used the signing statement to renege on a deal he had made with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) to keep torture off the list of interrogation techniques as part of the global war on terrorism. Throughout the fall of 2005, the administration applied enormous political pressure to persuade Senator Christopher S. Kelley is a visiting assistant professor of political science at Miami University and the author of a book and several articles on presidential signing statements and the unitary executive theory of presidential power. Bryan W. Marshall is an associate professor of political science at Miami University and the author of Rules for War (2005) and numerous articles on Congress, congressional–executive relations, and quantitative methods and modeling. AUTHOR’S NOTE: We thank David Rashid for research assistance, as well as anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June) 248 © 2008 Center for the Study of the Presidency