Forthcoming: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2004. Unedited draft: No citation without permission Truth and Multiple Realizability Michael P. Lynch Connecticut College Abstract: Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralisms key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions. Introduction Some things come in more than one form: there is more than one way for a friendship to flourish, for a person to be beautiful and for a life to be fulfilling. Alethic pluralism applies this thought to truth: there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. This is an idea with merit  but not, Ill argue, if it is taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth. Yet the chief pluralist intuition can be validated by understanding truth as a multiply realizable higher-order property of propositions. Alethic functionalism, as Ill call it, allows truth to be both many and one. The paper is divided into five parts. In the first, I briefly sketch some motivations for taking pluralism seriously, including some of those advanced in the recent literature. I exercise some license here, since I dont aim in this paper to engage in close textual analysis of any particular pluralist. I therefore move briskly to the second part, in which I discuss four problems for what I call strong alethic pluralism, and argue that these problems indicate that this sort of view is untenable. In the third and fourth and fifth parts, I present what amounts to a substantive new theory according to which truth is a type of functional property. I argue that this view, besides being of independent interest, avoids the problems mentioned above while offering a coherent and 1