In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument Daniel Haas Published online: 10 January 2012 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract I defend a hard-line reply to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Pereboom accuses compatibilists who take a hard-line reply to his manipulation argument of adopting inappropriate initial attitudes towards the cases central to his argument. If Pereboom is correct he has shown that a hard-line response is inadequate. Fortunately for the compatibilist, Pereboom’s list of appropriate initial attitudes is incomplete and at least one of the initial attitudes he leaves out provides room for a revised hard-line reply to be successfully mounted against the multiple-case argument. Keywords Free will Á Moral responsibility Á Four-case argument Á Manipulation Á Compatibilism Á Source incompatibilism 1 Introduction The manipulation argument is among the most resilient objections to compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility. One of the more compelling versions of the argument is Derk Pereboom’s multiple-case manipulation argument (also known as the four-case argument) (Pereboom 2001). Recently, Pereboom (2008) has responded to a promising compatibilist response to his argument (the hard-line reply) by focusing on what counts as justifiable initial attitudes to adopt towards the cases involved. He claims that compatibilists who defend a hard-line reply are committed to unjustifiable initial attitudes which subsequently stifle the debate. Pereboom suggests that anyone who adopts a more neutral starting point will realize that the multiple-case manipulation argument does motivate incompatibilism. D. Haas (&) Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500, USA e-mail: ddh08@fsu.edu 123 Philos Stud (2013) 163:797–811 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9847-6