Neurocognitive hacking A new capability in cyber conflict? John J. Heslen, Augusta University ABSTRACT. This article presents a discussion of neurocognitive hacking and its potential for use at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of cyber conflict. Neurocognitive hacking refers to the ability to activate specific neural areas of the brain, via subliminal or supraliminal stimuli, to shape the behavioral outcomes of an adversary. Research suggests that awareness of mortality-related stimuli has neural correlates in the right amygdala and left anterior cingulate cortex and mediates negative behavior toward out-group members, including unconscious discriminatory behavior. Given its in-group/out-group dynamic, the phenomenon could be exploited for use in information operations toward target populations, specifically ones that are multiethnic, multicultural, or multi- religious. Although development of the theoretical framework behind neurocognitive hacking is ongoing, mortality-related stimuli are proposed to activate one’s unconscious vigilance system to further evaluate the locus and viability of the suspect stimuli. Research suggests that the subsequent discriminatory affective reactions directed toward out-group members are representative of automatic heuristics evolved to protect the organism in the event a stimulus represents a more serious threat to survival. Therefore, presenting mortality-related stimuli over computer networks to targeted audiences may facilitate the ingestion of tailored propaganda or shaping of specific behavioral outcomes within a population, including sowing division in a target community or weakening support for a specific political regime. Key words: Subliminal stimuli, terror management theory, psychological operations, information operations, persuasion, cyberwar, propaganda, mortality bias T he use of propaganda in war likely dates to the dawn of civilization. Its methods are constantly being updated and improved to match current advancements in communications technology. As propa- ganda (considered a type of information operation) has been inextricably linked with war, employment of these capabilities by major world powers will likely increase in what are referred to as “gray zones” as the dawning of the nuclear age has made kinetic warfare between them far too risky. Philip M. Taylor, in his important work Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day (2003), noted that with the advent of nuclear weapons, war between nuclear-armed adversaries increasingly is prosecuted within the information space. The use of propaganda in information wars between great powers has now become “part of the struggle for perceptions in which words attempt to speak as loud as actions, and some- times even replace the need for action” (Taylor, 2003, p. 8). In fact, one has to look no further than the 2016 U.S. presidential election to get a glimpse of the new world of great-power information conflict. For example, the U.S. Intelligence Community report assessing Russian hacking activities during the presidential elec- tion noted that one of Russia’s primary goals was to “undermine the US-led liberal democratic order” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017, p. ii). More recently, a European Commission report out- lined the “sustained” disinformation campaign by the Russian government to depress voter turnout and influ- ence voter preferences during the 2019 European parlia- mentary elections (European Commission, 2019). As a result, many in the West are now well acquainted with the dangers of propaganda, sometimes colloquially referred to as “fake news.” And there is worry among cyberwarfare analysts that in the future, political conflict utilizing information operations may become ubiquitous doi: 10.1017/pls.2020.3 Correspondence: John J. Heslen, Augusta, Department of Social Sci- ences, Political Science, 1120 15th Street, Augusta, Georgia, 30904- 4562. Email: jheslen@augusta.edu P OLITICS AND THE L IFE S CIENCES • S PRING 2020 • VOL. 39, NO.1 87