Philosophy Compass 10/8 (2015), 533–546, 10.1111/phc3.12245 Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory Eva Erman 1 * and Niklas Möller 2 1 Stockholm University 2 Royal Institute of Technology Abstract The question of what role social and political practices should play in the justification of normative prin- ciples has received renewed attention in post-millennium political philosophy. Several current debates express dissatisfaction with the methodology adopted in mainstream political theory, taking the form of a criticism of so-called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non-ideal’ theory, of ‘practice-independent’ theory from ‘practice-dependent’ theory, and of ‘political moralism’ from ‘political realism’. While the problem of action-guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, the critics also share a number of methodological as- sumptions. Above all, their methodology is practice-dependent in the sense that an existing (social, polit- ical, or institutional) practice is assumed to put substantial limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating it. In other words, we cannot formulate and justify an appropriate principle with- out first understanding the practice (or its point and purpose) this principle is supposed to govern. The aim of this paper is to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to meth- odological commitments. We will investigate how this practice-dependent method may be understood and motivated. In particular, we point to challenges that must be met in order for the position to remain both distinct and attractive. The question of what role social and political practices should play in the formulation and jus- tification of normative principles has received renewed attention in post-millennium political philosophy, where mainstream accounts have been accused of proposing normative principles too detached from real-world circumstances to be of practical use. Several current debates bear witness to this discontent, taking the shape of a criticism of so-called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non- ideal’ theory, of ‘practice-independent’ theory from ‘practice-dependent’ theory, and of ‘polit- ical moralism’ from ‘political realism’. The problem of action-guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, but the critics also throw suspicion on the methodology used by mainstream political theorists. While coming from diverging quarters and working in different theoretical contexts, they share a number of methodological assumptions. The aim of the article is to examine this ‘methodological turn’. We attempt to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to methodological commitments, as well as identify problems and questions that ought to be further addressed. 1. Shared Methodological Assumptions In the post-Rawlsian literature, ideal theory as formulated by liberal egalitarians (e.g. Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1986) is under attack from non-ideal theorists who stress that political philoso- phy at large should take much more seriously the non-ideal circumstances consisting of relations of domination and power under which principles of justice are supposed to be not only applied but also formulated and justified (Simmons 2010; Swift 2008; Ypi 2010; Valentini 2009, 2012; cf. Mills 2005; Sen 2009; Farrelly 2007, Boot 2012). Similarly in the debate on global justice, © 2015 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd