Philosophical Issues, 25, Normativity, 2015 doi: 10.1111/phis.12060 KNOWLEDGE IS ALL YOU NEED Lisa Miracchi University of Pennsylvania Here’s a nice, simple view. 1 Knowing that p is the sole fundamental aim and achievement in the epistemic domain. It is a manifestation of epistemic competence, and we can metaphysically explain both the existence and the normative status of all other epistemic states in terms of knowledge and the competence it manifests. Justification, rationality, appropriate suspension of belief, you name it, earn their places in the realm of the epistemic because of their relations to knowledge. I believe this Simple View, and in this paper I will defend it from a particular kind of challenge: that knowledge is too weak and primitive to do the work the Simple View asks it to do. 2 Ernest Sosa is the main proponent of this challenge for the Simple View. He argues that an adequate epistemology needs to appeal not only to knowledge, but also to other epistemic states that crucially involve higher- order states. In particular, he claims that we not only need knowing that p, but also reflectively knowing that p and knowing full well that p. These states, according to Sosa, are different kinds of relations to p. They are not just higher-order knowledge states—although as we will discuss they are intimately connected to certain higher-order knowledge states. Rather, they are distinctive epistemic achievements, and they have normative statuses that do not wholly derive from their relations to knowledge. I will argue that Sosa is mistaken. Good old knowledge—what Sosa calls animal knowledge, when properly understood, can do all of the work that reflective knowledge and knowing full well are supposed to do. Knowledge, at least in the epistemic domain, is all you need. In section 1, I explain in more detail the challenge that Sosa poses for the Simple View, and consequently my direct virtue epistemology. 3 I then ex- plain Sosa’s accounts of reflective knowledge and knowing full well, further clarifying the debate. In sections 2, 3, and 4, I consider Sosa’s arguments that C  2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.