The Debate Over Compromise and the Goals of the Judicial Process Haim Shapira Introduction Talmudic literature documents a sharp debate among the tannaim regarding the legitimacy of the process of compromise or, to be more precise, of the process of bitsu‘ a. This dispute appears in a well-known passage in Tosefta Sanhedrin, chapter 1, and in both Talmuds (y.Sanh. 1:1 [18b], b.Sanh. 6b), and is also mentioned briefly in Sifre Deuteronomy §17. 1 Even upon first glance it can be seen that the debate assumes a principled character, relating to goals and values that lie at the very basis of the judicial process: truth, peace, and justice. Examination of the toseftan passage reveals that it is a well-fashioned and well-edited unit that not only presents positions but also discussion of the legal ques- tions relating to compromise and the goal of the judicial process. However, this passage requires clarification and interpretation. First of all, concerning what kind of compromise, precisely, is there disagree- ment? Does it refer to every process of compromise or only to a particular kind of compromise? Second, what are the reasons underlying the controversy, and what are the different understandings of the ju- dicial process that find expression therein? The question of the nature of compromise in the talmudic sources has been discussed by scholars on a number of occasions, but I think * ~ 183 | 1 Louis Finkelstein, ed., Sifre on Deuteronomy (New York: JTS Press, 2001), 28-29.