Economics at the FTC: The Google‐DoubleClick Merger, Resale Price Maintenance, Mortgage Disclosures, and Credit Scoring in Auto Insurance Micheal R. Baye Matias Barenstein Debra J. Holt Pauline M. Ippolito James M. Lacko Jesse B. Leary Janis K. Pappalardo Paul A. Pautler Michael G. Vita Abstract: Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) supports both the competition and consumer protection missions of the agency. In this year’s essay we discuss competition activity with a summary of our work on the Google-DoubleClick merger and recent activity on resale price maintenance, an area in which FTC economists had done significant prior research. On the consumer policy front, we discuss our study of ways to improve mortgage disclosures to facilitate consumer shopping and competition. Finally, we discuss our study of the effects of credit scoring on prices paid for auto insurance with a focus on the effects of scores on different racial and ethnic groups. Keywords: antitrust, consumer protection, credit scores, FTC, insurance, mergers, mortgage disclosures, race and ethnicity, and resale price maintenance. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington, DC 20580, U.S.A. Author for Correspondence. Tel.: 202-326-2550; FAX 202-326-2380; E- mail: mbaye@ftc.gov. We thank Jacqueline Westley for editorial assistance. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. Note: a final version of this paper was published in the September 2008 issue of the Review of Industrial Organization (33:3) pages 211-230.