Resentment of Advice and Norms of Advice Monique Jonas 1 Accepted: 1 June 2017 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017 Abstract Advice-giving is an important means of supporting others to act well. It inspires gratitude, indifference and resentment in equal measure. Although we can often predict a resentful reception for advice, its normative implications may be unclear. Should advice that is likely to be resented be withheld or modified because of its resentability, or delivered despite it? The norms that underwrite advice-giving, and which inform justified resentment, have thus far evaded systematic philosophical analysis. Using a case proposed by Edward Hinchman, the first part of this paper develops three lines of reasoning that explain why advice might be resented. The second part explores three norms of advice suggested by the case. Together they cast light upon the role of advice in our moral and social lives, and offer a starting point for practical reasoning about when to give resentable advice, and how to be a good advisor. Keywords Advice-giving . Ethics of advice . Resentment . Norms In ‘Advising as Inviting to Trust,’ Edward Hinchman presents the following case: Stephen and Anna are on their way to a visit with Anna’ s parents. Last time they visited, Stephen noticed an aspect of Anna’ s relationship with her mother that troubled him, and he now feels a powerful urge to give her a piece of advice. ‘Anna,’ he wishes to advise her, ‘be kinder to your mother. You’re no longer a teenager. You need each other. If you keep this up, you’ll realize what you’re doing too late and regret it. If only for your own sake, be kinder to her.’ He knows that he can’t say that, or anything like that. Given how things stand between them, he reasons, she would deeply resent a presumption on his part to advise her. He could get away with telling her what he thinks-well, part of what he thinks- but not with adopting that stance. Searching for his most unconfrontational, his most just- commenting-on-the-passing show tone of voice, he begins: ‘I wonder, Anna, if things wouldn’t go better if you were kinder to your mother…^ (Hinchman 2005:357) Ethic Theory Moral Prac DOI 10.1007/s10677-017-9816-z * Monique Jonas m.jonas@auckland.ac.nz 1 University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand