begging the question: a reply to lycan 313
Begging the question: a reply to Lycan
Robert W. Lurz
There are two competing types of account of state consciousness on the
philosophical market: higher-order representational (HOR) accounts and
first-order representational (FOR) accounts.
1
HOR accounts attempt to
explain state consciousness in terms of a mental state’s relation to higher-
order mental states. FOR accounts, on the other hand, attempt to explain
state consciousness in terms of a mental state’s relations to environmental
states of affairs, behaviour, and first-order mental states. Recently, Lycan
(2001) has given a simple deductive argument which he takes to demon-
strate that the truth lies on the side of HOR accounts. Lycan presents his
argument as follows:
(1) A conscious state is a mental state whose subject is aware of being
in it. [Definition]
(2) The ‘of’ in (1) is the ‘of’ of intentionality; what one is aware of is
an intentional object of the awareness.
Analysis 61.4, October 2001, pp. 313–18. © Robert W. Lurz
1
For contemporary defenders of HOR accounts, see Lycan 1996, Armstrong 1997,
Rosenthal 1997 and Carruthers 2000. For contemporary defenders of FOR accounts
see Dretske 1997 and Lurz 1999.