Contractarianism, Liberal Neutrality, and Epistemology SIMON CLARKE* University of Oxford This paper examinesthree arguments that attempt to justify liberal neutrality. Firstly the type of neutrality between conceptions of the good that is sought by the arguments is explained. Then the contractarian procedure that is one of the premises of each of the arguments is presented. The remaining sections then examine the arguments, which are Thomas Nagel's appeal to epistemic restraint, Brian Barry's appeal to the uncertainty thesis, and John Rawls's appeal to the burdens of judgement. The arguments attempt to show how the contractarian procedure results in liberal neutrality. They do so by trying to show how no conception of the good can be acceptable to everyone due to the epistemological status of conceptions of the good. It is concluded that none of the arguments succeeds. In this paper I consider three arguments that attempt to show that principles of justice should be neutral between the plurality of conceptions of the good that exists in most modern societies. These arguments all consist of two premises. The ®rst, identical in all the arguments, is a contractarian procedure according to which principles of justice should be reasonably acceptable to everyone that is subject to them. The second is that there is something about the epistemological status of conceptions of the good that ensures that the contractual agreement will be neutral between them. These arguments dier over what they take that epistemological status to be. It is this second premise and these dierences that I wish to focus on. The ®rst section describes the concept of liberal neutrality and the second explains the contractarian procedure. The remaining sections examine the argu- ments.Theoverallconclusionshallbethatnoneoftheargumentsaresuccessful. Liberal Neutrality According to the ideal of liberal neutrality, in public policy and law the state should be neutral between conceptions of the good. To understand this ideal morefully,weneedtoknowwhatismeantbya conceptionofthegood,andwhat it means for a theory to be neutral between such conceptions. A conception of the good is a view of what gives value to an individual's life and of what is a worthwhile way of life. It could also be a view of what is good for all. Many #Political Studies Association 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 627±642 * I am grateful to Martin Wilkinson, Andrew Moore, Tim Dare, three anonymous referees of Political Studies and a seminar audience at the University of Auckland for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.