Performance of Islamic banks Do the frequency of Sharīʿah supervisory board meetings and independence matter? Abdalmuttaleb Musleh Alsartawi Department of Accounting and Economics, Ahlia University, Manama, Bahrain Abstract Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the composition of Sharīʿah supervisory boards (independence and frequency of meetings) and the performance of Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Design/methodology/approach – The study developed a multiple linear regression model, and data were collected from the annual reports of 48 standalone Islamic banks listed in the GCC countries covering the period between 2013 and 2017. Findings – The results showed a statistically significant and negative relationship between the composition of the Sharīʿah supervisory boards and the performance of Islamic banks. Research limitations/implications – As the current study used only one indicator, that is Return on Assets to measure performance, it is recommended to expand the framework of this study, through the addition of market-based performance indicators such as Tobin’s Q. Practical implications – This study recommends the GCC countries to follow a more proactive Sharīʿah governance model to strengthen their frameworks from both regulatory and non-regulatory aspects. Originality/value – The study contributes to the Sharīʿah governance and Islamic banking literature relating to the GCC countries as previous studies gave no attention to the composition of Sharīʿah supervisory boards. Keywords Sharīʿah governance, Sharīʿah supervisory board independence, Sharīʿah supervisory board frequency of meetings, Performance, Islamic banking Paper type Research paper Introduction Despite the dire necessity of a proper corporate governance system, Islamic banks (IBs) have the responsibility to ensure compliance with the Sharīʿah (Islamic law) principles in their operations and practices. In conventional finance, the term “governance” normally refers to corporate governance; yet in Islamic finance “governance” could also refer to Sharīʿah governance. This means that IBs need to conform to both regulatory and Sharīʿah requirements depending on the type of bank (window, subsidiaries or standalone). Sharīʿah governance, which is exclusive to Islamic banks, can be defined as the processes and frameworks that assure compliance of business operations with the Sharīʿah so as to build © Abdalmuttaleb Musleh Alsartawi. Published in ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http:// creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode Performance of Islamic banks 303 Received 17 May 2018 Revised 29 June 2018 16 September 2018 8 August 2019 30 August 2019 Accepted 31 August 2019 ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance Vol. 11 No. 2, 2019 pp. 303-321 Emerald Publishing Limited 0128-1976 DOI 10.1108/IJIF-05-2018-0054 The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at: www.emeraldinsight.com/0128-1976.htm