Page 1 of 10 Russia’s Orthodox Soft Power Nicolai N. Petro 1 “For us the rebirth of Russia is inextricably tied, first of all with spiritual rebirth . . .and if Russia is the largest Orthodox power [pravoslavnaya dershava], the Greece and Athos are its source.” Vladimir Putin during a state visit to the Mount Athos, September 2005. 2 Foreign policy is about interests and values. But while Russia’s interests are widely debated, her values are often overlooked, or treated simplistically as the antithesis Western values. In fact, however, as professor Andrei Tsygankov points out in his book Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin, Russia’s relations with the West go through cycles that reflect its notion of honor. 3 By honor, he means the basic moral principles that are popularly cited within a culture as the reason for its existence, and that inform its purpose when interacting with other nations. Over the past two centuries, Tsygankov notes that in pursuit of its honor Russia has cooperated with its European neighbors, when they have acknowledged it as part of the West; responded defensively, when they have excluded Russia; and assertively when they have been overtly hostile to Russia’s sense of honor. Sometimes a nation’s sense of its honor overlaps with present day interests, but it cannot be reduced to the national interest alone, because political leaders must respond to existential ideals and aspirations that are culturally embedded. A nation’s sense of honor, therefore, serves as a baseline for what might be called the long term national interest. 1 Nicolai N. Petro is professor of politics at the University of Rhode Island. These remarks were prepared for the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) seminar in Koenigswinter, Germany, February 15-18, 2015. CIOR is an independent advisory bodies to the Military Committee of NATO. 2 “Vladimir Putin: Rossiya--pravoslavnaya derzhava,” Pravaya.ru, September 9, 2015. http://pravaya.ru/news/4774 3 Andrei Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. For many analysts the term Russky mir, or Russian World, epitomizes an expansionist and messianic Russian foreign policy, the perverse intersection of the Russian state and Church interests. It is little noted that the term actually means something quite different for each party. For the state it is a tool for expanding Russia’s cultural and political influence, while for the Russian Orthodox Church it is a spiritual concept, a reminder that God, through the baptism of Rus, transformed these people and consecrated them to the task of building a Holy Rus. Moreover, over time, the Church’s usage is proving to be the more enduring. The close, symphonic relationship between the Orthodox Church and state in Russia today thus provides Russian foreign policy with a definable moral framework, one that, given its popularity, is likely to continue to shape the country’s aspirations well into the future.