1 Penultimate draft. Please cite the published version in Ethno-Epistemology (Routledge). Knowing How and Two Knowledge Verbs in Japanese Masaharu Mizumoto, Shun Tsugita, Yu Izumi 1. Knowledge-How: Background A countless number of different actions are performed every day, such as swimming, skiing, playing the piano, playing chess, and so on. We sometimes perform (and sometimes fail to perform) these actions skillfully, cleverly, rationally, or carefully. Philosophers use “intelligent” as an umbrella term to cover all these positive characterizations of actions. Knowledge-how is taken as the intelligence in such intelligent actions, such that an agent acts intelligently when the action is guided by knowledge-how. Thus, knowing how differentiates actions that are intelligent from those that aren’t. There are mainly two opposing views in philosophy concerning the nature of knowledge-how. Intellectualism holds that knowing how is a species of propositional knowledge. On the other hand, anti-intellectualism holds that knowing how is distinct from propositional knowledge. Put in positive terms, anti-intellectualism is the view that knowing how to ϕ is a certain kind of ability or disposition to ϕ intelligently. Since Gilbert Ryle’s classical presentation of the issue (Ryle 1946; 1949), the majority of philosophers have been leaning toward anti-intellectualism, in the sense that they acknowledge a considerable degree of independence between knowing how and propositional knowledge. In their seminal paper, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson attempted to rehabilitate intellectualism (Stanley & Williamson 2001). They argue that the standard semantic analysis of English knowing how constructions (“S knows how to F”) motivates intellectualism. For example, Stanley and Williamson (hereafter S&W) analyze the knowing how ascription “Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle” in the relevant context as being true if and only if, for some contextually relevant way w which is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle, Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle (S&W p. 426), where the ascribed knowledge is conceived under what they call a practical mode of presentation. If their analysis is on the right track, it seems to vindicate intellectualism. However, since S&W’s analysis addresses just one particular language, for it to