IN DEFENCE OF UNCONDITIONAL FORGIVENESS by Eve Garrard and David McNaughton ABSTRACT In this paper, the principal objections to unconditional forgiveness are canvassed, primarily that it fails to take wrongdoing seriously enough, and that it displays a lack of self-respect. It is argued that these objections stem from a mistaken understanding of what forgiveness actually involves, including the erroneous view that forgiveness involves some degree of condoning of the offence, and is incompatible with blaming the offender or punishing him. Two positive reasons for endorsing unconditional forgiveness are considered: respect for persons and human solidarity; and it is argued that the latter provides more plausible grounds for it than the former. We need to forgive and be forgiven, every day, every hour – unceasingly. That is the great work of love among the fellowship of the weak that is the human family. Henri Nouwen Lying in the rubble of the Enniskillen Remembrance Day bombing, Gordon Wilson held the hand of his daughter, Marie, as she lay beside him, dying. At that moment, he said, he forgave the bombers. Such forgiveness is clearly not conditional on any change of heart in the wrongdoer. Wilson did not wait to see if the bombers would feel remorse or change their ways. Assuming the forgiveness was genuine and that he had no ulterior motives for expressing it, it might seem churlish not to feel unreserved admiration for what he did. Yet a survey of the philosophical literature reveals that many writers on this topic think that this kind of unconditional forgiveness, at least for serious wrongs, is inappropriate or even just wrong. We should not forgive until the wrongdoer has at least repented and apologised, and perhaps offered reparation and evidence of reformation. 1 Our aim in this paper is to defend the view that unconditional forgiveness is morally permissible, and that there are morally cogent reasons in its favour. While it is always admirable to forgive (where the nature of the offence has been fully grasped), we need not suppose that it is obligatory to do so. In many cases, especially those involving serious wrongs, forgiveness is supererogatory. We shall suggest that much of the hostility to unconditional forgiveness stems from misconceptions about what is involved in forgiveness. Or rather, since there are a number of different models of forgiveness in various traditions, the hostility stems from a failure to appreciate that there is conceptual space for a coherent and defensible conception of forgiveness on which unconditional forgiveness does not have the objectionable consequences that its critics claim. 2 I Objections to unconditional forgiveness. Critics of unconditional forgiveness hold that one can be too willing to forgive. Here are two quotations which exemplify the main thrust of such objections. Can the victim forgive [the wrongdoer] without any act of atonement on his part? The victim can indeed disown the act, in the sense that he explicitly says something like ‘Let us regard this as not having happened’ and then acts as 1 Among those advocating ‘no forgiveness without repentance’ are Kolnai, 1974; Lang, 1994; Murphy, 1988; Novitz, 1998; Richards, 1988; Swinburne, 1989; Wilson, 1988. 2 Opponents of unconditional forgiveness have not had things all their own way in recent literature. Among those who have made some of the points we wish to make ourselves are: Downie 1965; Holmgren, 1993; O’Shaughnessy, 1967.