Payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism ☆ Nicolás Kosoy a, ⁎, Esteve Corbera b,c a Ecosystem Service Economics Unit, Division of Environmental Policy Implementation, United Nations Environment Programme, 00100 Nairobi, Kenya b School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom c Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Zuckerman Institute for Environmental Connective Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom abstract article info Article history: Received 29 April 2009 Received in revised form 2 November 2009 Accepted 3 November 2009 Available online 16 December 2009 Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) economically reward resource managers for the provision of ecosystem services and are thus characterised by (i) an ecological function subject to trade; (ii) the establishment of a standard unit of exchange; (iii) and supply, demand and intermediation flows between those who sell and buy ecosystem services. This paper departs from the term commodity fetishism, broadly understood as the masking of the social relationships underlying the process of production, to illuminate three invisibilities in the commodification of ecosystem services. Firstly, we argue that narrowing down the complexity of ecosystems to a single service has serious technical difficulties and ethical implications on the way we relate to and perceive nature. Secondly, the commodification of ecosystem services denies the multiplicity of values which can be attributed to these services, since it requires that a single exchange-value is adopted for trading. Finally, we suggest that the process of production, exchange and consumption of ecosystem services is characterised by power asymmetries which may contribute to reproducing rather than addressing existing inequalities in the access to natural resources and services. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), ecosystem services can be understood as those benefits obtained from nature that satisfy human needs and simultaneously fulfil other species requirements (Daily, 1997; Costanza et al., 1997; MEA, 2005). The flow of these services, derived from stocks of natural resources, is recognised as ‘important elements in overall wealth along physical, financial, human, and social capital’ (Vira and Adams, 2008, pp. 2). The MEA classifies ecosystem services in four categories, namely provi- sioning services, which include food, water, timber and genetic resources; regulating services, such as the regulation of climate, floods and waste treatment; cultural services, such as recreation and aesthetic enjoyment; and supporting services such as soil formation, pollination and nutrient cycling. Nevertheless, discussions on how to classify ecosystem services to inform natural resource management and policy decisions continue (Carpenter et al., 2006; Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Wallace, 2007; Fisher et al., 2009). This is a consequence of the application of the ‘ecosystem service concept’ to several policy contexts and in many initiatives worldwide (Fisher and Turner, 2008; Muradian et al., 2010-this issue). Following mainstream economic rationality, ecosystem services are externalities since they provide benefits which are not paid for and therefore are not internalised in economic decisions. Various organisa- tions and researchers argue that the degradation of ecosystem services can be reversed through Payments for Ecosystem or Environmental Services (PES), which can in turn alleviate poverty and establish a new ‘urban–rural compact’ by transferring funds from ‘consumers’ to ‘providers’ of these services (Pagiola et al., 2005; Gutman, 2007). Nevertheless, others suggest that it may be counterproductive to expect that PES can address both environmental degradation and poverty. Wunder (2008), for example, highlights that an excessive focus on poverty can deviate attention from those areas where the loss of ecosystem services is more acute and where payments could make a difference in changing unsustainable land-use patterns. PES are often defined as voluntary transactions where a well-defined ecosystem service is bought by a buyer (i.e. someone who is willing to pay for it), if and only if the provider secures the provision of such service (Wunder, 2005). However, this prescriptive definition is problematic because it excludes a variety of PES schemes operating under different principles, with ill-defined ecosystem services or under inefficient provision levels (Muradian et al., 2010-this issue). The most common PES schemes include local initiatives for conserving watershed services and regional and global markets for biodiversity and carbon sequestration services (Corbera et al., 2007). Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) have also identified markets for landscape beauty or ‘bundled services’ which sell several ecosystem services either together or individually. National governments and public–private partnerships involving local communities, NGOs, firms and municipalities are among Ecological Economics 69 (2010) 1228–1236 ☆ This article is a contribution to the forthcoming Special Section. “Payments for Ecosystem Services: Alternative approaches from Ecological Economics” edited by Unai Pascual, Esteve Corbera, Roldan Muradian and Nicolas Kosoy. ⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1603 592813; fax: +254 20 7624249, +44 1603 591170. E-mail address: nicolas.kosoy@unep.org (N. Kosoy). 0921-8009/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.002 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Ecological Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon