Andrei A. Buckareff* Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2001 Abstract: Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability condition for free will that requires that agents possess the ability to decide differently when they make a free deci- sion. On the Humean view of laws of nature, laws of nature are taken to be contingent non-governing descriptions of significant regularities that obtain in the entire history of the universe. On Humean compatibilism, agents are taken to possess dual ability when making free decisions because what the laws of nature will finally be is (at least partially) dependent upon how an agent decides. In this paper, I argue that the tenability of Humean compati- bilism depends in part upon what theory of time is correct. More specifically, I argue that Humean compatibilism is untenable in a deterministic universe if eternalism is true. Keywords: free will, compatibilism, humean supervenience, laws of nature, time, eternalism Introduction Recently, John Perry (2004, 237–45) identified three different strategies that tradi- tional compatibilists about free will can adopt in response to incompatibilist arguments. The first strategy involves endorsing a weak theory of laws and a strong account of dual-ability. On the second strategy, which is favored by Perry (2004, 241), the compatibilist holds to a strong theory of laws and a weak theory of dual-ability. The third strategy amounts to being committed to both a weak theory of laws and a weak account of dual-ability. *Corresponding author: Andrei A. Buckareff, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Marist College, 3399 North Road, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601, USA, E-mail: andrei.buckareff@marist.edu Metaphysica 2019; 20(1): 51–71 Brought to you by | Lancaster University Authenticated Download Date | 4/11/19 6:12 PM